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WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, 
THE "RIGHT" TO VOTE, AND 
THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
THIRTY -NINTH CONGRESS 
"If that history does not prove what I think it does, we are at least 
entitled to be told why." The request is that of Mr. Justice Harlan, 
dissenting in Carrington v. Rash/ which held that a Texas constitu-
tional provision preventing a citizen who had entered military serv-
ice in another state from acquiring voting residence in Texas so 
long as he remained in the military denies equal protection.2 The 
William W. Van Alstyne is Professor of Law, Duke University. 
l 380 u.s. 89, 97 (1965). 
2 The petitioner had entered the Army in Alabama in 1946, at the age of 18, and had 
resided in Texas since 1962, where he intended to remain permanently. He owned a 
home in El Paso, Texas, where he lived with his wife and two children. He also op-
erated a small business in El Paso and paid property taxes in Texas. "But for his uni-
form, the State concede[d] that the petitioner would be eligible to vote in El Paso 
County, Texas." Id. at 91. The Court did not determine, as it might have done, that 
the Texas provision specially disabling servicemen otherwise qualified to vote was in-
valid under Article VI, cl. 2 (the Supremacy Clause), by construing the federal stat-
ute under which the petitioner served in the military to forbid such discrimination. 
The statute itself was a valid exercise of congressional power under Article I, § 8, cl. 
12, "to raise and support Armies," and related sections relevant to government of the 
military. Nor did it touch upon the possible relevance of Article IV, § 2 ("The 
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens 
in the several States"), by characterizing the Texas provision as unreasonably dis-
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"history" to which Mr. Justice Harlan referred is the legislative 
history of the Fourteenth Amendment. What he believes that his-
tory proves is that the Fourteenth Amendment, and especially§ 2, 
"expressly recognizes the States' power to deny 'or in any way' 
abridge the right of their inhabitants to vote for 'the members of 
the [state] Legislature.' "3 As a consequence, all complaints arising 
only under the Equal Protection Clause and directed against alleged 
invidious discrimination affecting the right to vote should be dis-
missed "for failure to state a claim of federal right."4 
Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Carrington v. R.asb preserves the 
position he took in the reapportionment cases, that complaints un-
der the Equal Protection Clause of partial disfranchisement result-
ing from malapportioned state legislative districts "should all have 
been dismissed . . . for failure to state a cause of action, because 
what has been alleged or proved shows no violation of any constitu-
tional right."5 His position respecting the irrelevance of equal pro-
tection to state suffrage issues was consistently maintained last Term 
in three other cases, in addition to Carrington v. Rasb. In two of 
these he emphasized that however vulnerable to constitutional chal-
lenge the so-called literacy tests of Mississippi and Louisiana may 
be under the Fifteenth Amendment, they are not vulnerable under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 In the third, he agreed that a Virginia 
poll tax scheme that imposed unnecessary burdens on qualified 
voters in federal elections violated the Twenty-fourth Amendment, 
but he carefully disavowed dicta in the Court's opinion that the state 
criminating against a class of persons because of their original statns as citizens of 
other states. The holding of the case was based exclusively on the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
3 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589, 594 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
4 380 U.S. at 97, 99. 
5 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589, 591-92 (1964). See also WMCA, Inc. v. 
Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633, 655 (1964); Maryland Committee for Fair Representation 
v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 676 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 693 (1964); Ro-
man v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 712 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-fourth General Assembly 
of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713,741 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 20 (1964); 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266, 330 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 382 
(1963). 
6 United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 144 (1965); Louisiana v. United 
States, 380 U.S. 145, 156 (1965). 
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statute in question may also have been subject to challenge under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.7 
The persistence with which Mr. Justice Harlan has maintained 
his position is completely understandable. In his dissent of 1964, 
in Reynolds v. Sims, he devoted forty-two pages to a comprehen-
sive legislative history of § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Almost 
all of it was consistent only with the conclusion he derived from it. 
Neither in that case nor in any of the other reapportionment cases 
did any member of the Court fault Mr. Justice Harlan's historical 
presentation. Nor did they undertake to demonstrate in what re-
spect, if any, it was irrelevant to the issues at hand. Nearly a year 
and several similar cases later, when Mr. Justice Harlan chided the 
7 Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 544 (1965). It should be noted that these 
are not the first cases to have reviewed voter qualifications under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. In Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 
(1959), a North Carolina literacy qualification was examined on the merits of a 
claim that, on its face, it denied equal protection. The test was upheld, although 
the Court applied a mere "rational nexus" test in finding the test sufficiendy related 
to a permissible policy of promoting intelligent use of the ballot. No argument 
appears to have been made that the test might be discriminatory as applied to Ne-
groes disadvantaged from being obliged to attend inferior, segregated schools, re-
sulting in a lower incidence of literacy attributable to state action. In Breedlove v. 
Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937), a poll tax payment qualification was examined on the 
merits of a claim that it denied equal protection because of exemptions provided 
for certain classes. The requirement was upheld under a rational nexus test. No 
argument based on the Fifteenth Amendment, or on a theory of unwarranted dis-
crimination under the Fourteenth Amendment, appears to have been made. Cf. 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). The case does not dictate the result recendy 
reached in Harper v. Virginia Board of Election, 240 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. Va., 1964), 
prob. juris. noted, 380 U.S. 930 (1965). In Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 70 (1932), 
the Court invalidated a Democratic party qualification restricting primary election 
voters to whites ouly, relying solely on the Equal Protection Clause. In Nixon v. 
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), the Court unanimously invalidated a state qualifica-
tion restricting party primaries to whites ouly, relying solely on the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Cf. Mr. Justice Harlan's explanation of the two Nixon cases in Reyn-
olds. 377 U.S. at 614-15 n. 72. In Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898), lit-
eracy, residency, poll ta.'"{, and morality qualificatious were examined on the merits 
of an equal protection claim and upheld on their face as not discriminatory against 
Negroes. In declaring that the qualifications "reach weak and vicious white men as 
well as weak and vicious black men," id. at 222, the Court found that the qualifica-
tions were consistent with equal protection as understood at that time, rather than 
that the Equal Protection Clause provided no basis for review. Minor v. Happer-
sett, 21 Wall. 162 (1874), was argued and decided exclusively on the basis of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause. No equal protection claim was asserted. Com-
pare, with these cases, the dicta in Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632-33 (1904); 
Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 362 (1915). 
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Court in Carrington v. Rash for its telling silence, there was still 
no explanation forthcoming. Given ample opportunity either to 
refute Mr. Justice Harlan's historical review, or to demonstrate its 
irrelevance to the issues at hand, the majority seems tacidy to have 
conceded the argument, if not the vote. Nor is this clearly an issue 
sufficient for the Court to say that we cannot turn back the clock. 
The right to vote probably cannot be shown to be of greater im-
portance to the individual in 1965 than it was in 1866, when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was approved by Congress. The varieties 
and degrees of disfranchisement probably cannot be shown to be 
much greater or more serious than, or different from, those current 
in 1866.8 Nor can it be shown that the arguable relevance of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to state electoral matters was overlooked 
or submerged during active consideration of that Amendment. To 
the contrary, a review of Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Reynolds 
v. Sims suggests that the "right" to vote was the single most delib-
erately considered subject of the time and that the provision made 
in § ,2 of the Amendment was intended to be an exclusive remedy 
understood by all to preclude any application of § 1 to state elec-
toral matters. 
In these unique circumstances, the binding character of the his-
torical record9 may be far different from the bare relevance of 
history to other issues that sometimes divide the Court. For in none 
of the other kinds of cases where it was brought to bear did it cast 
the kind of blinding light that Mr. Justice Harlan sees here. The 
issues of "state action,'' "segregation," "incorporation of the bill of 
8 See 377 U.S. at 602-11; Gn.LETIE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: PoLITics AND THE PASSAGE 
oF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT (1965); McGOVNEY, THE AMERICAN SUFFRAGE MED-
LEY (1949); PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES (1918); UNITED 
STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 1959 REPORT 19-26; }AMES, THE FRAMING OF 
THE FoURTEENTH AMENDMENT 13 (1956); note 111 infra and accompanying teA"t. 
9 But see Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 502, 523 (1964): "Do past meanings bind the 
present? Yet the question has virtually answered itself. If . . • the meaning of a 
word is its use, and if its use can never be found apart from its conteA"t, then we 
need only add that an inseparable constituent of context is the time at which the 
use occurs to show that a past meaning cannot bind the present. It is precisely the 
time element of the context of use which is 'the past.' A past use, is looked to a 
past time, and as such does not bind the present unless the present chooses to be 
so bound.'' See also Kurland, "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative 
and Executive Brancbes of the Government," 78 HARv. L. REv. 143, 145-46 (1964): 
"Neither the question of definition nor that of primacy is resoluble, however much 
the Court may try, by resort to constitutional history.'' 
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rights," corporations as "persons," are not like this one, if only 
because the original understanding was not alleged to be so clear 
and uniform and because contemporary circumstances, scarcely 
foreseeable even by the most visionary reconstructionists, are so 
vasrly different. 
This article proposes to rake the history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment still another time to determine whether it proves what 
Mr. Justice Harlan says it does.10 It may appear to be a tedious 
undertaking, especially because there is already a surfeit of Four-
teenth Amendment histories11 and because the general character of 
the period is doubdess thought to be well enough known. Yet, the 
issues on which those histories focused and the controversies which 
engendered their selection of materials were different. A matter 
affecting the integrity of judicial review ought not to be resolved 
by inference from historical reviews in which this subject was of 
but incidental concern.12 In short, I know of no way fairly to deter-
1o I do this only to determine whether the legislative history on which Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan relied supports the original understanding he found in it. Because of 
the conclusion I reach on this issue, it is unnecessary to determine whether Reyn-
olds v. Sims and the other cases could still have been "rightly" decided even if the 
original understanding were exactly as Mr. Justice Harlan supposed. See Wofford, 
supra note 9, and references cited therein. 
11 See, e.g., HARRis, THE QUEST FOR EQuALITY (1960); ]AMES, op. cit. supra note 8; 
2 CRossKEY, PoLITics AND THE CoNSTITUTION 1083-1118 (1953); TENBROEK, THE 
ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FoURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951); W ARSOFF, EQUALITY 
AND THE LAw (1938); KENDRICK, JoURNAL OF THE JoiNT CoMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON 
REcoNSTRUCTION (1914); FLACK, THE ADoPTioN oF THE FoURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
(1908); 3 THoRPE, CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY oF THE UNITED STATES 235-405 (1901); 
Frantz, Congressional Power To Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment against Pri-
vate Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964); Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation 
Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960); Bickel, The Original Understanding and the 
Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1955); Graham, Our "Declaratory" Four-
teenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1954); Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legis-
lative History," and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. Cm. 
L. REv. 1 (1954); Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protec-
tion of tbe Laws," 50 CoLUM. L. REv. 131 (1950); Graham, The Early Antislavery 
Background of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1950 W1s. L. REv. 479, 610; Fairman, 
Does tbe Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original 
Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949); Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371 (1938); Boudin, Truth and Fiction 
about tbe Fourteenth Amendment, 16 N.Y.U.L.Q.19 (1938). 
12 See note 11 supra. See also the excellent and comprehensive legislative history 
of the Fifteenth Amendment in GILLETTE, op. cit. supra note 8. For an earlier treat-
ment of the same subject, see MATHEws, LEGISLATIVE AND JuDICIAL HISTORY OF THE 
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT (1909). 
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mine whether the history of the Founeenth Amendment proves 
what Mr. Justice Harlan alleges, short of making the same original 
search that he presumably made before dissenting in Reynolds v. 
Sims. 
I. THE "UNDERSTANDING" OF SECTION Two 
Mr. Justice Harlan's case against the application of § 1 of 
the F ouneenth Amendment to voting rights consiSts essentially of 
two complementary parts.13 The first is devoted to evidence that, 
notwithstanding the very broad language of § 1 which lays down 
an unqualified normative standard of equal protection and which 
does not, on its face, admit of any exception, 14 it was declared and 
understood at the time of its promulgation not to apply to suffrage 
qualifications as determined by the states.15 The second, and by 
13 For discussions respecting the current enforceability of § 2, see Margolis, Ju-
dicial Enforcement of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 23 LAW IN TRANS. 
128 (1963); Zuckerman, A Consideration of the History and Present Status of Sec-
tion 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 FoRD. L. REv. 93 (1961); Bonfield, The 
Right To Vote and Judicial Enforcement of Section Two of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 46 CoRNELL L.Q. 108 (1960). For a brief critical treannent of Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan's view of § 2, see Auerbach, The Reapportio1l11lent Cases: One Person, 
One Vote-One Vote, One Value, 1964 SUPREME CoURT REvmw 1, 74-79. 
14 Should this settle the matter? At one time, Mr. Justice Frankfurter implied 
that "historic limits" need not be controlling in the case of "broad standards of 
fairness written into the Constitution (e.g., 'due process,' 'equal protection of the 
laws,' 'just compensation')," which, "by their very nature, allow a relatively wide 
play for individual legal judgment." United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 321 
(1946) (concurring opinion). May we conclude with Learned Hand that "history 
does not elucidate [the] contents" of the Fourteenth Amendment, "cast as [it is] in 
such sweeping terms"? HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 30 (1958). The Court appeared 
to agree when, in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 
(1961), it said: "Because the virtue of the right to equal protection of the laws 
could lie only in the breadth of its application, its constitutional assurance was re-
served in terms whose imprecision was necessary if the right were to be enjoyed 
in the variety of individual-state relations which the Amendment was designed to 
embrace." Yet, notice the sudden relevance of history respecting the scope of 
equal protection in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 289-316, 335-40 (1964). "Our 
sworn duty to construe the Constitution requires ••• that we read it to effectuate 
the intent and purposes of the Framers. We must, therefore, consider the history 
and circumstances indicating what the Civil War Amendments were in fact de-
signed to achieve." !d. at 289 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Compare the attitude ex-
pressed by Chief Justice Hughes in Home Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 
398, 442-43 (1934). For discussions of cases that have expanded the scope of 
equal protection, see HARRis, op. cit. supra note 11, at 59-158; Kurland, supra note 
9, at 143-49; Kellett, The Expansion of Equality, 37 So. CAL. L. REv. 400 (1964). 
15 377 U.S. at 595. 
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far the larger, part consists of evidence that however open to doubt 
the scope of § 1 might otherwise be, the language, juxtaposition, 
purpose, and legislative history of § 2 altogether remove that doubt. 
He thus concludes that § 2 "expressly recognizes the States' power 
to deny lor in any way' abridge the right of their inhabitants to 
vote for lthe members of the [state] Legislature.' "16 Section 2 is 
specifically concerned with voting rights, and it provides an ex-
clusive remedy that precludes or preempts application of § 1. If I 
understand him correcdy, he believes, moreover, that § 2 equally 
precludes the application of any earlier provisions of the Constitu-
tion to state voting rights.17 Because the larger part of his argument 
is devoted substantially to a treatment of § 2, and because the legis-
lative history of that section has not received much attention else-
where, it may be well to begin with it. 
His :first point is that the Court "disregards entirely the signifi-
cance of § 2, which reads: "18 
"Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole 
number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. 
But wben tbe rigbt to vote at any election for the choice 
of electors for President and Vice President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, tbe Executive and Judicial 
officers of a State, or tbe members of tbe legislature tbereof, 
is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being 
twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, 
or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, 
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be 
reduced in the proportion which the number of such male 
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State." 
From this language he concludes: "If indeed the words of the 
Fourteenth Amendment speak for themselves, as the majority's dis-
regard of history seems to imply, they speak as clearly as may be 
against the construction which the majority puts on them."19 For 
Mr. Justice Harlan, the language of § 2 "expressly recognizes the 
16Jd. at 594. 
17 The inference is drawn from Mr. Justice Harlan's statement that § 2 expressly 
recognizes the power of the states to deny or abridge the right to vote (ibid.), plus 
his note 21 at p. 599, discussed hereafter in the te:1.:t at notes 28 and 60. 
18 377 U.S. at 593-94. (Emphasis added by Mr. Justice Harlan.) 
19/d. at 594. 
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States' power to deny 'or in any way abridge the right of their in-
habitants to vote,' " subject only to the single remedy provided for 
in § 2 itself, i.e., a reduction in that state's basis of representation in 
the House of Representatives (and the Electoral College).20 He 
necessarily concludes as well in Reynolds v. Sims that the phrase 
in § 2, "or in any way abridge," includes partial denials to vote 
resulting from malapportionment that dilutes the political force of 
some votes. He emphasized that phrase, presumably to make clear 
how "highly implausible" it would be to contend that § 1 "controls 
methods of apportionment but leaves the right to vote itself un-
protected. "21 
His second point, by way of reinforcing the first, is to establish 
that §§ 1 and 2 were deliberately integrated parts of a single amend-
ment, and that necessarily the special handling of voting rights in 
§ 2 implied, by its simultaneity with, and juxtaposition to, § 1, that 
voting rights were not protected by§ 1. He remarks: 22 
The Amendment is a single text. It was introduced and 
discussed as such in the Reconstruction Committee, which 
reported it to the Congress. It was discussed as a unit in 
Congress and proposed as a unit to the States, which ratified 
it as a unit. 
The comprehensive scope of the second section and its par-
ticular reference to the state legislatures preclude the sug-
gestion that the first section was intended to have the result 
reached by the Court today. 
His third point is that throughout the debate on the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it was frequently asserted that § 2 precluded the 
application of § 1 to political interests and, in the House at least, 
"every speaker on the resolution, with a single doubtful exception, 
assumed without question that ... 'the second section excludes the 
conclusion that by the first section suffrage is subjected to congres-
sional law.' "23 Thus, Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out that "Thad-
deus Stevens, [who] introduced debate on the resolution on May 
8, . . . in unmistakable terms ... recognized the power of a State 
to withhold the right to vote: 24 
"If any State shall exclude any of her adult male citizens 
from the elective franchise, or abridge that right, she shall 
2o Ibid. 
21Jd. at 612. 
22 /d. at 594. 
23Jd. at 599. 
24/d. at 596-98. 
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forfeit her right to representation in the same proportion. 
The effect of this provision will be either to compel the States 
to grant universal suffrage or so to shear them of their 
power as to keep them forever in a hopeless minority in the 
national Government, both legislative and executive." Clos-
ing his discussion of the second section, he noted his dis-
like for the fact that it allowed "the States to discriminate 
[with respect to the right to vote] among the same class, 
and receive proportionate credit in representation." 
Representative Bingham, "the author of the first section in the 
Reconstruction Committee and its leading proponent,"25 was even 
more emphatic with respect to the preemptive character of § 2. He 
declared, in words italicized by Mr. Justice Harlan: 26 
"The amendment does not give, as the second section 
shows, the power to Congress of regulating suffrage in the 
several States. 
"The second section excludes the conclusion that by the 
first section suffrage is subjected to congressional law; save, 
indeed, with this exception, that as the right in the people 
of each State to a republican government and to choose 
their Representatives in Congress is of the guarantees of 
the Constitution, by this amendment a remedy might be given 
direcdy for a cause supposed by Madison, where treason 
might change a State government from a republican to a 
despotic government, and thereby deny suffrage to the 
people." 
The latter part of Bingham's statement might, of course, imply that 
Congress derived some authority from § 1 to invalidate state suffrage 
disqualifications that violated a republican form of government as 
guaranteed under § 4 of Article IV. In a footnote, however, Mr. 
Justice Harlan denied that this was so:27 
It is evident from the context of a reference to a republican 
government that Bingham did not regard limitations on the 
right to vote or the denial of the vote to specified categories 
of individuals as violating the guarantee of a republican form 
of government. 
Thus, Bingham is read, in harmony with Mr. Justice Harlan's view 
of the preemptive effect of § 2, to say that § 2 expressly recognizes 
exclusive state authority over the franchise, irrespective of all other 
provisions in the Constitution. Mr. Justice Harlan concludes by 
2~ Id. at 598. 26 I d. at 598-99. 27 Id. at 599 n. 21. 
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referring to his Appendix A, containing statements by other speak-
ers who recognized "in express terms or by unmistakable implica-
tion, that the States retained the power to regulate suffrage within 
their borders."28 
Turning to the Senate's consideration of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Mr. Justice Harlan notes that debate "began on May 23, and 
followed the same pattern."29 With respect to the effect of§ 2, he 
quotes Senator Howard's expression of regret that "it did 'not rec-
ognize the authority of the United States over the question of 
suffrage in the several States at all ... '" and that: 30 "'Tbe second 
section leaves tbe right to regulate the elective franchise still with 
the States, and does not meddle with that right.' " Referring to 
other "representative statements from the debates" collected in his 
Appendix B, Mr. Justice Harlan concludes that "it was fully under-
stood by everyone that neither the first nor the second section 
interfered with the right of the States to regulate the elective fran-
chise."31 
To summarize, Mr. Justice Harlan's conclusion that § 2 is pre-
emptive, i.e., that it excludes political interests from the protection 
that might otherwise be inferred from the general language of other 
constitutional provisions, is based primarily on the following ob-
servations of the treatment and understanding of that section in 
the thirty-ninth Congress: 
1. Section 2 deals specifically and comprehensively with the 
power of a state to disfranchise citizens, it establishes a special and 
exclusive means for penalizing the exercise of that power, and its 
inclusion in the unitary, single text of the Fourteenth Amendment 
precludes the suggestion that the first section would have any 
application to issues of state suffrage. 
2. The preclusive or preemptive character of § 2 was expressly 
acknowledged by a number of the principal proponents of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, "assumed without question" by "every 
speaker in the House," with a single doubtful exception, and rec-
ognized "in express terms or by unmistakable implication" by those 
speakers, and "fully understood by everyone" in the Senate debates. 
It will be seen, however, that there are certain mistakes and seri-
2s Ibid. 29 I d. at 600. 
30 I d. at 600-01. (Emphasis added by Mr. Justice Harlan.) 
31 I d. at 602. 
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ous exaggerations in this reading of the congressional history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In the .first place, §§ 1 and 2 of the Amend-
ment were not "introduced and discussed in the Reconstruction 
Committee" as "a single text." Rather, § 2 was originally approved 
by the Joint Committee and reported to the House on January 22, 
1866, as H.R. No. 51, a wholly separate constitutional amendment. 
It was debated at length and approved by the House in its original 
form before the proposal that ultimately became § 1 was even re-
ported to the House, on February 13. It was debated at equal length 
in the Senate in February and March of 1866, nearly two full 
months before it reappeared in the Joint Committee's Report of 
April 30 as part of the packaged FoUrteenth Amendment. In the 
course of its consideration, the issue of "preemption by implication" 
was fully discussed. While the possibility of such an implication 
disturbed and alienated a number of Radicals otherwise sympa-
thetic to the limited objective of the proposal, the existence of any 
such implication was emphatically denied by both the House and 
Senate chairmen of the Joint Committee that reported the bill. 
Moreover, § 2 was primarily the handiwork of Thaddeus Stevens, 
a man of quite different temperament and purpose from Bingham, 
the principal author of § 1. 
In the second place, the unitary amendment introduced in the 
Joint Committee on April 21, 1866, and drafted by Robert Dale 
Owen, had little in common with H.R. No. 63 and H.R. No. 51, 
the separate forerunners of §§ 1 and 2, respectively. Owen's pro-
posal was immediately amended almost beyond recognition by the 
committee, by the substitution of modified versions of H.R. No. 63 
and H.R. No. 51 for Owen's first and second sections. Far from 
being a single text the several parts of which were carefully and 
deliberately integrated by men of a common mind and a mutual 
understanding of the implications and interrelationships of the sev-
eral sections, the Fourteenth Amendment was a package of pro-
posals, the more significant of which were pieced together from 
independent bills offered by different men at different times and 
originally debated in Congress as wholly separate amendments. In-
deed, the brevity of the three-day House debate on H.R. No. 127, 
the packaged Fourteenth Amendment bill, is probably attributable 
to the fact that its most significant components had previously been 
considered at length. A more accurate description of the placement 
of § 2 in the FoUrteenth Amendment is that "[i]t became a part of 
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the Fourteenth Amendment largely through the accident of politi-
cal exigency rather than through the relation which it bore to the 
other sections of the Amendment."32 
The Appendix33 roughly describes the sequence of proposals cul-
minating in the package amendment and a breakdown of events 
after H.R. No. 127, the package amendment, was reported to 
Congress. 
In the third place, even confining ourselves to the brief debate 
of the packaged FoUrteenth Amendment in the House between 
May 8 and 10, 1866, it was not true that "every Speaker on the 
resolution, with a single doubtful exception, assumed without ques-
tion that ... 'the second section' " preempted the first with regard 
to suffrage. To the contrary, several speakers insisted that § 1 might 
apply to suffrage, and the "exception" acknowledged by Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan was by no means "doubtful," either in terms of what 
he said or in terms of his position as a member of the Joint Com-
mittee. Moreover, during the long, previous debate on § 2 in the 
House and Senate, its principal proponents emphasized that it did 
not acknowledge the constitutionality of state disfranchisement 
laws. 
In the foUrth place, § 2 was designed primarily to meet a partic-
ular, separable, and immediate problem of protecting the Repub-
lican hegemony in Congress, quite aside from any long-term effort 
to secure the right to vote against arbitrary discrimination by the 
states. Viewing it as a device to induce the southern states to en-
franchise the Negro, the principal proponents had every reason to 
suppose only that it would fail. Viewing it as a device to prevent 
southern representatives from becoming a substantial force in Con-
gress, however, they had considerable reason to suppose that it 
would succeed. 
In the :fifth place, the phrase in § 2, "or in any way abridged," 
did not refer to voting discrimination resulting from malapportion-
ment but to something having nothing to do with malapportion-
ment. Indeed, the subject of malapportionment was never even 
considered by the thirty-ninth Congress, and the penalty to be 
applied against states that denied the right to vote was probably 
incapable of application to discrimination by way of malapportion-
32 MATHEWS, op. cit. supra note 12, at 14. 
33 P. 86, infra. 
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ment. Section 2 was neither "comprehensive in scope" nor at all 
suitable to any resolution of the undiscussed issue of malapportion-
ment. 
In short, notwithstanding the express statements by Bingham 
and Howard and the more equivocal statements of others on whom 
Mr. Justice Harlan depended in his opinion, there was probably 
no reliable understanding whatever that § 2 would preclude Con-
gress (or the courts) from employing ~ources of constitutional 
authority other than§ 2 to affect state suffrage power. The history 
demonstrating that there was no such consensus follows. 
On December 4, 1865, the :first day of the :first session of the 
Thirty-ninth Congress, Thaddeus Stevens won House approval for 
his resolution to establish a Joint Committee on Reconstruction to 
inquire into the condition of the states lately in rebellion and to 
report all appropriate bills.34 With slight modification, the resolu-
tion was approved by the Senate on December 12.35 The committee, 
of fifteen members, consisted of twelve Republicans and three 
Democrats. The Democrats were Rogers (New Jersey) and Grider 
(Kentucky) of the House, and Reverdy Johnson (Maryland) of 
the Senate. The Republicans were Stevens (Pennsylvania), chair-
man of the House section of nine members including Bingham 
(Ohio), Washburne (Illinois), Morrill (Vermont), Conkling (New 
York), Boutwell (Massachusetts), and Blow (Missouri); and Fes-
senden (Maine), chairman of the Senate section of six members 
including Howard (Michigan), Williams (Oregon), Grimes (Io-
wa), and Harris (New Y ark) .36 
On December 18 Stevens rose in the House to speak at length 
in criticism of President Andrew Johnson's message to Congress, 
in which Johnson had urged the speedy restoration of the southern 
states and the readmission of southern representatives to Congress.37 
In the course of his remarks, Stevens spoke favorably of a proposal 
he had put forward on December 5, to base representation in Con-
34 Gong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1866) (hereafter cited as GLOBE). 
35Jd. at 30. 
36Jd. at 46-47, 57. See also The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on 
Reconstruction, in KENDRICK, op. cit. supra note 11, at 37-39 (hereafter cited as 
KENDRICK). For profiles of the members of the Joint Committee, see KENDRICK at 
155-97; ]AMES, op. cit. supra note 8, at 41-46. 
37 GLOBE at 72-75. 
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gress upon the number of electors (voters) rather than upon the 
population in each state.38 He announced the objectives of that 
proposal to be: 39 
a) to secure perpetual ascendency to the party of the Union. 
b) to render our republican Government firm and stable 
forever. 
c) to avoid a Democratic majority in Congress and in the 
Electoral College. 
d) to avoid assumption of the rebel debt and repudiation 
of the Federal debt. 
e) to avoid the oppression of the freedman; the reamendment 
of the state constitutions, and the reestablishment of slavery. 
Stevens made very plain just what it was that made him so appre-
hensive of a Democratic takeover unless some change were made 
in the formula for representation in Congress as established by 
Article I,§ 2, cl. 3. Under the then existing formula, representatives 
were apportioned according to population with the exception that 
every five slaves were counted only as three people. As a result of 
the Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment, 
the Confederate states would be entided to a gain in congressional 
representation reflecting an increase in representational basis of 
two-fifths of four million Negroes recently made free. According 
to Stevens' figures, the unreconstructed South would be entitled to 
eighty-two representatives in Congress, of whom thirty-seven 
would "represent" disfranchised Negroes, unless the apportionment 
formula of Article I, § 2, were changed. The net political effect of 
the Civil War might otherwise be to increase southern representa-
tion in Congress and the Electoral College by thirteen completely 
hostile Democratic votes. To avoid that effect, he endorsed the pro-
posal to amend the Constitution "to base the representation in Con-
gress upon the number of electors, instead of the population, of the 
several states."40 
Even under the proposed change, of course, the South could still 
increase its representation to the extent that Negroes were allowed 
to vote. But that possibility, far from worrying Stevens, served his 
interests equally well. For one thing, he gready favored Negro 
suffrage and consistently supported all efforts toward that end, to 
the extent he thought them politically feasible. For another, he held 
38/d. at 10. 39 Id. at 74. 40 Ibid. 
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that the Negro vote would moderate the influence of any increase 
in southern representation: 41 
If they should grant the right of suffrage to persons of color, 
I think there would always be Union white men enough in 
the South, aided by the blacks, to divide representation and 
thus continue the Republican ascendency. If they should 
refuse to thus alter their election laws it would reduce the 
representatives of the late slave States to about forty-five and 
render them powerless for evil. 
On January 9, Stevens proposed in the Joint Committee a new 
amendment to apportion representatives according to the number 
of voters in each state who were natural-born or naturalized citizens 
of the United States and at least twenty-one years of age.42 The 
proposal was not satisfactory to the rest of the committee, however, 
probably because they had been surprised to learn what effect ap-
portionment strictly according to voters would have among the 
northern states, as suggested on January 8 in Representative Blaine's 
remarks before the House. Blaine had acknowledged the declared 
and limited objective of Stevens' plan.43 But he also noted that 
limitation on southern representation would not be the only effect, 
if representatives were to be apportioned according to the num-
ber of voters in each state. Suffrage standards varied considerably 
among the northern states, as did the respective numbers of quali-
fied voters, even between states with reasonably similar suffrage 
standards. Blaine pointed out, for instance, that because pioneer 
California had a far higher percentage of males over the age of 
twenty-one than did Vermont, 58 per cent of the California popu-
lation consisted of voters as against only 19 per cent in Vermont, 
even though the two states had similar total populations and similar 
voter qualifications. The effect of the Stevens plan would operate 
greatly to favor California over Vermont, and to accomplish similar 
representational dislocations elsewhere outside the South.44 
41 Ibid. 
42 KENDRICK at 41. The proposal was the same as that which Stevens had made to 
the House on December 5, before the Joint Committee was established. His origi-
nal proposal had been referred to the Judiciary Committee. GLOBE at 10. 
43 Blaine had duly noted that: "The effect contemplated and intended by this 
change ••• is to deprive the lately rebellious States of the unfair advantage of a 
large representation in this House, based on their colored population." GLOBE at 141. 
44/hid. 
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To avoid this sort of unwanted incidental effect, the Joint Com-
mittee referred Stevens' proposal to a subcommittee for modifica-
tion.45 On January 20, the subcommittee, consisting of Stevens, 
Fessenden, Howard, Conkling, and Bingham, reported the follow-
ing proposals, in the alternative, to the full committee: 46 
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among 
the several States within this Union, according to the respec-
tive numbers of citizens of the United States in each state; and 
all provisions in the Constitution or laws of any State, whereby 
any distinction is made in political or civil rights or privileges 
on account of race, creed or color, shall be inoperative and 
void. 
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among 
the several States which may be included within this Union, 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole 
number of citizens of the United States in each state; pro-
vided that, whenever the elective franchise shall be denied or 
abridged in any State on account of race, creed or color, all 
persons of such race, creed, or color, shall be excluded from 
the basis of representation. 
The second of these alternative proposals was approved by the 
committee, with the modification that "creed" was deleted, and 
"persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed" was substituted 
for "citizens of the United States in each State."47 On January 22, 
Stevens reported this proposal to the House in behalf of the com-
mittee, and it was designated H.R. No. 5U8 
We may appropriately pause at this point to inject several obser-
vations generally in agreement with Mr. Justice Harlan's view of 
what was implied by § 2. First, the fact that the Joint Committee 
considered an amendment to prohibit voting discrimination on racial 
45 KENDRICK at 45-47. 
46 !d. at 50-51. At the same time, the subcommittee reported the following pro-
posed amendment as a companion to whichever of the alternatives was approved. 
"Congress shall have power to make all laws necessary and proper to secure to 
all citizens of the United States, in every State, the same political rights and privi-
leges; and to all persons in every State equal protection in the enjoyment of life, 
liberty and property." On Stevens' motion, it was separated and, on January 24, 
this proposal was referred to a subcommittee consisting of Bingham, Boutwell, 
and Rogers. !d. at 56. 
47 Id. at 51-54. As approved by the committee, the proposal is nearly the same 
as that suggested on January 8 by Blaine. See GLOBE at 141-42. 
48 GLOBE at 351. 
33] THE "RIGHT" TO VOTE AND THE 39TH CONGRESS 49 
grounds does seem to imply that it otherwise regarded state laws 
providing for such discrimination as constitutional.49 Second, the 
fact that a more limited reduction-of-representation-basis alterna-
tive was simultaneously considered and adopted, and that the pro-
posal to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race was not adopted, 
appears to imply that § 2 itself recognizes the exclusive power of 
states over suffrage qualifications. Beyond this, the speeches by 
Stevens50 and Conlding51 in support of H.R. 51 initially appear to 
be to the same effect. 
Nevertheless, subsequent developments in the House quickly 
dispelled the impression that might otherwise have persisted, the 
impression that the amendment proposed by H.R. No. 51 would 
preclude the application of any other constitutional provision to 
state suffrage qualifications. The clarification of the nonpreemptive 
effect of H.R. No. 51 developed in response to complaints by a 
number of Radicals that the bill might rob Congress of power to 
broaden the franchise, which, they insisted, it already had. 
On January 10, Kelley of Pennsylvania argued at length that 
Article I, § 4, authorizing Congress to "alter" the "manner" of hold-
ing elections, permitted Congress to abolish state suffrage dis-
49 But note that the committee was still considering the proposal reproduced 
supra, at note 46, as an additional amendment. 
oO GLOBE at 351: "It proposes to change the present basis of representation to 
a representation upon all persons, •.. It does not deny to the States the right to 
regulate the elective franchise as they please .••. " 
filJd. at 357: "To level this favoritism which has come out of the results of the 
war [i.e., the imminent prospect that rebel state congressional power would be 
enhanced by adding representatives attributable to free, but disfranchised, Ne-
groes], three modes have been proposed, each of course by way of amendment 
to the Constitution. 
"First. To make the basis of representation in Congress and in the Electoral 
College consist of sufficiently qualified voters alone. 
"Second. To deprive the States of the power to disqualify or discriminate po-
litically on account of race or color. 
''Third. To leave every State perfectly free to decide for itself, not only who 
shall vote, but who shall belong to its political community in any way, and thus 
to say who shall enter into its basis of representation and who shall be shut out. 
What the States decide for themselves in their own affairs they decide for them-
selves in their national affairs. If any State contains a class unfit or supposed to 
be unfit for political rights, or unworthy to act politically in the States, this class 
shall not be put upon the nation as fit and worthy to be represented in the nation's 
councils. 
"The last proposition has met the approval of the committee, and the others 
have not." 
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qualifications that it found to be incompatible with republican 
forms of government.52 To guard against the possibility of H.R. 
No. 51 being misunderstood as preempting that authority, he of-
fered the following amendment on January 23: 53 
Provided, That this article shall not be construed to affect 
the power of Congress to regulate the qualifications for 
electors of the most numerous branch of the Legislatures of 
the several States. 
On the same day, Farnsworth of Illinois argued that congressional 
power to broaden the franchise already existed under Article IV, 
§ 4, and that this section "ought to be taken into consideration by 
this Congress and enforced."54 He then turned to what he thought 
might be the dangerous and debilitating implication of H.R. No. 
51.55 
Sir, I will not admit that any State has the right to disfran-
chise a portion of its citizens; and if this proposition makes, 
expressly or by implication, any such admission, I cannot vote 
for it .... [B]y no vote of mine shall there be incorporated in 
the Constitution a provision which shall, even by implication, 
declare that a State may disfranchise any portion of its citi-
zens on account of race or color. 
On January 24, Eliot of Massachusetts agreed that Congress could 
invalidate state suffrage disqualifications under its authority to guar-
antee a republican form of government in each state. Like Farns-
worth he expressed objections to the implications of Stevens' pro-
posed amendment. 56 
On January 25, Higby of California argued that no "State which 
excludes any class of citizens [from voting] on account of race or 
color is republican in form,"57 and that he was tentatively opposed 
to H.R. No. 51 because he thought "it gives a power to the States 
to make governments that are not republican in form."58 Stevens' 
response at this time was confusing: 59 
MR. STEVENS. I say to my friend if I thought that according 
to any portion, or verse or chapter of Lindley Murray, by any 
fair construction of language, such an interpretation could 
52Jd. at 182-83, 408-09, 412. 
53Jd. at 377. 
54/d. at 383. 
55/bid. 
. 56 ld. at 406. 
57 !d. at 427. 
58/d. at 428. 
59/bid. 
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be given as he gives, I would vote against it myself. But I 
do not believe there is anything in that objection. 
MR. HIGBY. "Provided, that whenever the elective franchise 
shall be denied or abridged in any State on account of race 
or color, all persons of such race or color shall be excluded 
from the basis of representation." 
MR. STEVENs. May I ask my friend one question? Does 
that take from or add to any powers which the States now 
have? 
MR. HIGBY. I beg pardon of the gentleman; he cannot get 
rid of this proposition in that way. I ask him distinctly if it 
does not acknowledge a power in a State to do such a thing. 
MR. STEVENs. Yes, sir, it does acknowledge it, and it has 
always existed under the Constitution. 
MR. HIGBY. I do not acknowledge that it is in the Consti-
tution as it now is. 
MR. STEVENS. Then we do not give it to them. 
51 
Then, on January 25, Bingham laid out his own views respecting 
the nonpreemptive effect of H.R. No. 51 and the broad power of 
Congress to regulate suffrage in the states. The quotation is rather 
long, but it is unusually rewarding, especially to determine the cor-
rectness of Mr. Justice Harlan's understanding60 "that Bingham did 
not regard limitations on the right to vote or the denial of the vote 
to specified categories of individuals as violating the guarantee of a 
republican form of government": 61 
60 377 U.S. at 599 n. 21. 
61 GLoBE at 431-32. In addition to Kelley, Farnsworth, Eliot, Higby, and Bing-
ham, the following members of the House also declared their belief at the time 
that Congress already possessed authority over state suffrage qualifications: Shella-
barger, Ohio (Art. IV, § 4 forbids a state from "excluding an entire race from 
the right of the elective franchise"), id. at 405; Cook, Illinois (Art. IV, § 4 might 
apply if a state denied a majority of its inhabitants the right to vote, by class 
suffrage restrictions), id. at 411; Boutwell, Massachusetts (relying on a principle 
of government recognized in the Declaration of Independence and derived from 
natural law), id. at 309; Julian, Indiana (relying on Art. IV, § 4, and the Thir-
teenth Amendment), id., 39th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 56 (1866). A number of these 
arguments continue to find favor with contemporary scholars. See, e.g., 1 CROSSKEY, 
op. cit. supra note 11, at 522-41; Bonfield, Baker v. Carr; New Light on the Guar-
antee of Republican Government, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 245 (1962); Bonfield, The 
Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Comtitutional Desuetude, 
46 MINN. L. REv. 513 (1962); Maggs & Wallace, Congress and Literacy Tests: A 
C011mzent on Comtitutional Power and Legislative Abnegation, 27 LAw & CoN-
TEMP. PRon. 510 (1962); Werdegar, The Constitutionality of Federal Legislation To 
Abolish Literacy Tests: Civil Rights C01JmZission's 1961 Report on Voting, 30 
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 723 (1962). 
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The guarantee of your Constitution, that the people shall 
elect their Representatives in the several States, cannot be set 
aside or impaired by inserting in your Constitution, as a pen-
alty for disregarding it the provision that the majority of a 
State that denies the equal rights of the minority shall suffer 
a loss of political power. 
I have endeavored to show that the words of the Constitu-
tion, the people of "the States shall choose their Representa-
tives," a majority of the free male citizens of the United 
States in every State of this Union, being of full age, shall 
have the political power subject to the equal right of suffrage 
in the minority of free male citizens of full age. There is a 
further guarantee in the Constitution, of a republican form of 
government to every State, which I take to mean that the 
majority of the free male citizens in every State shall have the 
political power. I submit to my friend that this proviso is 
nothing but a penalty for a violation on the part of the 
people of any State of the political right of franchise guar-
anteed by the Constitution to their free male fellow-citizens 
of full age .••. 
MR. HIGBY. I ask whether under the amendment we pro-
pose to adopt as a part of the Constitution of the United 
States, a State could not, by virtue of the proviso which it 
contains, have a right to disfranchise any class of citizens on 
account of race or color? 
MR. BINGHAM. • • • I say that the proviso is a penalty, and 
nothing but a penalty, inflicted on the State if its ruling class 
disregard and violate the guarantees of the Constitution of the 
political right of all the free people therein, being male citi-
zens of the United States of full age, to participate in the 
choice of electors, by imposing on any part of one class 
special disabilities not imposed on the other class. 
The guarantee in the .first article of the second section of 
the Constitution rightly interpreted is, as I claim, this, that 
the majority of the male citizens of the United States of 
full age in each State shall forever exercise the political power 
of the State with this limitation, that they shall never by caste 
legislation impose disabilities upon one class of free male 
citizens to the denial or abridgment of equal rights. The 
further provision is that the United States shall guarantee to 
each State a republican form of government, which means 
the majority of male citizens of full age in each State shall 
govern, not however, in violation of the Constitution of the 
United States or of the rights of the minority ...• 
MR. BROMWELL. I ask the gentleman whether the pending 
amendment reported from the committee does not, by forcible 
implication, if sanctioned by three fourths of the State Legis-
[1965 
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latures, admit that a majority may disfranchise a minority? 
MR. BINGHAM. As I have before stated, and I beg the 
gentleman's pardon for asking his attention to the fact there 
has not been such a construction, in my opinion, of a law 
which imposes only a penalty, for centuries, if ever, in any 
country where the common law obtains. The construction 
insisted upon by the gentleman amounts to this, that a law 
which inflicts a penalty or works a forfeiture for doing an 
act, by implication authorizes the act to be done for doing 
which the penalty is inflicted. There cannot be such a con-
struction of the proviso. It is a penalty. It says in terms that 
if any of the States of the United States shall disobey the 
Constitution, that as a penalty such State shall lose political 
power in this House, to the extent of the whole class or race 
against any part of whom the unjust discrimination has been 
made .... 
You place upon your statute-book a law punishing the 
crime of murder with death. You do not thereby, by implica-
tion, say that anybody may, of right, commit murder. You 
but pass a penal law. You do not prohibit murder in the Con-
stitution; you guarantee life in the Constitution. You do not 
prohibit the abuse of power by the majority in the Consti-
tution in e;..:press terms, but you guarantee the equal right of 
all free male citizens of full age to elect Representatives; and 
by the proviso you inflict a penalty upon a State which denies 
or abridges that right on account of race or color. In doing 
that we are not to be told that we confer a power to over-
ride the e;..:press guarantees of the Constitution. We propose 
the penalty in aid of the guarantee, not in avoidance of it. 
53 
As though Bingham's emphatic remarks had not sufficed, Stevens 
directly met the concern of his Republican colleagues on January 
31, after reporting the following modification of H.R. No. 51 in be-
half of the Joint Committee: 62 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States 
which may be included within this Union according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed: Provided, That 
whenever the elective franchise shall be denied or abridged 
in any State on account of race or color, all persons therein 
of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis of 
representation. 
Defending his bill against the alarms of his own Radical colleagues, 
Stevens declared: 63 
62 GLOBE at 535. 63 I d. at 536. 
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But some of our friends are appprehensive that this is an 
implied permission to the States to regulate the elective fran-
chise within the States. Now, Sir, I venture to say that there 
is no good philologist who, upon reading this proposed 
amendment, will for a single moment pretend that it either 
grants a privilege or takes away a privilege from any State 
on that subject. It does, however, punish the abuse of that 
privilege if it exists. 
[1965 
During the concluding debate on H.R. No. 51, no member of the 
House disputed Stevens' interpretation of what was, after all, pri-
marily his own bill. 64 When, on the same day, the bill was approved 
by a vote of 120 to 46, Stevens, Bingham, Lawrence, Kelley, and 
Farnsworth were among the "yeas."65 The first two had declared 
that H.R. No. 51 would not preempt congressional power over 
·suffrage qualifications. The latter three had declared, before Stevens 
reassured them, that they might vote against the bill were it under-
stood to have a preemptive effect. Of those expressing some anxiety 
lest H.R. No. 51 be taken to imply exclusive state power over suf-
frage qualifications, only Eliot voted against the bill, and Higby ab-
stained. 
It is true, of course, that Stevens' reassurance of January 31-that 
H.R. No. 51 did not attempt to resolve the separate issue of the ex-
tent to which Congress might regulate state suffrage requirements-
was not then made in reference to § 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The explanation is simply that § 1 was not formally reported 
to the House until February 13, two weeks after H.R. No. 51 had 
been approved. 66 It is also true that when the package amendment 
64 It was modified in line with Blaine's proposal of January 8. See note 47 Sllpra. 
65 GLOBE at 538. 
66 !d. at 813. The bill, H.R. No. 63, provided: "The Congress shall have power 
to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of 
each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States: and to all 
persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and 
property." 
This proposal represented the Joint Committee's modification of the subcom-
mittee's recommendation of January 20, quoted in note 45 Sllpra. The following 
intermediate version was reported by the subcommittee and rejected by a 5 to 
5 vote of the committee, on January 27: "Congress shall have power to make all 
laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure all persons in every state full 
protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property; and to all citizens of the 
United States in any State the same immunities and also equal political rights and 
privileges." Fessenden, Williams, Morrill, and Bingham voted for it. KENDRICK at 
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was under consideration in the House on May 8, Stevens did express 
his disappointment with § 2. His disappointment was announced, 
however, not on the basis that § 2 preempted any authority Con-
gress might previously have enjoyed over suffrage under existing 
constitutional provisions, or on the basis that it preempted any au-
thority Congress might prospectively acquire under § I. He was dis-
appointed, rather, because he preferred the reduction-of-representa-
tion penalty established by H.R. No. 51 to the less stringent penalty 
provided by§ 2 as finally adopted.67 Under H.R. No. 51, the basis 
of a state's representation would be reduced according to the whole 
number of Negroes in a state if any Negro were disfranchised be-
cause of race or color. Under the revision accomplished by § 2, as 
reported on April 30, a state's basis of representation would be re-
duced only in proportion to the actual number of disfranchised 
adult male citizens. 68 
Finally, there are the remaining passages from Stevens' statement 
of May 8 on which Mr. Justice Harlan relied: 69 
This amendment . . . allows Congress to correct the unjust 
legislation of the States, so far that the law which operates 
upon one man shall operate equally upon all. Whatever law 
punishes a white man for a crime shall punish the black man 
precisely in the same way and to the same degree. Whatever 
56-57. On February 3, Bingham moved to substirute the proposal which became 
H.R. No. 63, and, on February 10, the committee agreed that it be reported to 
Congress. I d. at 60-62. 
67 GLOBE at 2459-60. 
as Compare H.R. No. 51, text supra note 62, with § 2 of H.R. No. 127 as 
reported to the House on April 30, 1866, id. at 2286: "Representatives shall be 
apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in 
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But whenever in any State the elective 
franchise shall be denied to any portion of its male citizens not less than twenty-
one years of age, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or 
other crime, the basis of representation in such State shall be reduced in the pro-
portion which the number of male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
such male citizens not less than twenty-one years of age." 
The change in the reduction-of-representation formula in § 2 of H.R. No. 127, 
from the formula proposed in H.R. No. 51, reflects criticism that a reduction 
based only on disfranchisement solely because of race was readily subject to eva-
sion, that it was unfair to other disfranchised groups, and that representation 
should be reduced only according to the acrual number disfranchised. See id. at 
353, 385, 407, 433, 765. 
6D[d. at 2459. 
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law protects the white man shall afford "equal" protection 
to the black man. Whatever means of redress is afforded 
to one shall be afforded to all. Whatever law allows the white 
man to testify in court shall allow the man of color to do the 
same. These are great advantages over their present codes. 
Now different degrees of punishment are inflicted, not on 
account of the magnitude of the crime, but according to the 
color of the skin. Now color disqualifies a man from testify-
ing in courts, or being tried in the same way as white men. I 
need not enumerate these partial and oppressive laws. Unless 
the Constitution should restrain them those States will all, 
I fear, keep up this discrimination, and crush to death the 
hated freedmen. 
[1965 
There surely is nothing in this statement to exclude the applica-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause to the "partial and oppressive 
laws" that utterly failed to "afford 'equal' protection to the black 
man," by disfranchising him solely because of his race or color. The 
whole character of the discussion suggests the opposite. Surely the 
right to vote is one essential protection that white men enjoyed, and 
surely equal protection would require that black men enjoy it to the 
same extent. And surely, too, one way of reshaclding the hated 
freedman was to bar him from having any voice in government. If 
the special function of the Equal Protection Clause was to restrain 
the states from crushing the freedman, why would it not apply to 
guarantee him an equal right to vote? 
But Stevens' ensuing remarks on § 2 are nevertheless taken by .Mr. 
Justice Harlan to preclude the unqualified force of what Stevens 
had just said: 70 
If any State shall exclude any of her adult citizens from the 
elective franchise, or abridge that right, she shall forfeit her 
right to representation in the same proportion. The effect of 
this provision will be either to compel the States to grant 
universal suffrage or so to shear them of their power as to 
keep them forever in a hopeless minority in the national 
Government, both legislative and executive. 
Does this evidence an understanding on Stevens' part that an excep-
tion was to be read into the unqualified language of § 1 and that the 
Equal Protection Clause could not be applied against partial and 
oppressive laws denying the freedmen their voice in government? 
Possibly, but certainly not necessarily. The better inference, if any 
70]bid. 
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at all is to be drawn, is that he was now addressing himself to a 
special provision designed to protect the Republican hegemony in 
Congress. It is to be remembered that the very first issue to which 
Stevens addressed himself in the Thirty-ninth Congress was the 
avoidance of a Democratic takeover that would come about through 
the readmission of an increased number of southern representatives 
elected only by white secessionists, in coalition with the northern 
Democrats already in Congress.71 This was the immediate problem 
posed by the apportionment formula in Article I, and this was the 
problem that the special penalty of H.R. No. 51 as carried into § 2 
of H.R. No. 127 was designed to solve.72 It was a problem that 
might require special handling, moreover, even if the election of 
representatives by whites only were clearly in violation of the Equal 
Protection Oause or of other constitutional provisions. 
It is also to be remembered that Stevens, as well as most of the 
other Radicals, did not place much faith in the self -executing capac-
ity of constitutional provisions, unaided by supplementary legisla-
tion. So far as they were concerned, the Thirteenth Amendment, of 
71 See text supra, at note 40; GLoBE at 141, 351, 357, 385, 410, 2459, 2407, 2468, 
2510,2539,2767,2963. 
72 The announced secondary objective, to induce the states to extend the fran-
chise in order to maintain full representation in Congress, could scarcely have been 
talten seriously by any member of the Joint Committee. During practically the 
whole time that H.R. No. 51 was under consideration, the Joint Committee was 
holding hearings on conditions in the South. The question was repeatedly raised 
whether the states were likely to eJ..'tend the franchise in response to the induce-
ment of H.R. No. 51. Almost none of the witnesses interrogated on this point, 
from Union commanders to white, native southerners, felt that the states would 
ell.'tend the franchise rather than suffer a loss in representation. See Report of the 
Joint Committee on Reconstruction, H.R. REP. No. 30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866) 
at pp. 5, 137, 158, 162 (Part II), pp. 99, 132 (Part III), pp. 42, 132 (Part (IV). 
Here is a colloquy of February 10, 1866, between Senator Howard and B. R. 
Grattan, a native Virginian and member of the Virginia House of Delegates: 
"Question. Are you aware of the nature of the constitutional amendment now 
pending in the Senate of the United States in reference to the basis of representa-
tion [H.R. No. 51]? 
"Answer. Yes, sir. 
"Question. You know its effect? 
"Answer. Yes. 
"Question. [Howard explains that the proposed amendment would operate to 
reduce a state's basis of representation by all of a given race or color if any of 
that race or color were denied the right to vote.] I want to ascertain your opinion 
of that subject, whether you think the people of Virginia are likely ever to con-
sent to let negroes vote? 
"Answer. I should say not, sir, under no circumstances." 
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its own force, had accomplished little. This same Congress had al-
ready found it necessary to follow the Thirteenth Amendment with 
the Civil Rights Act, even after the First Freedmen's Bureau Act, 
and to continue the presence of an occupation force in the South to 
protect the Negro. In this very speech, Stevens had spoken of § 1 as 
significant because it "allows Congress to correct the unjust legis-
lation of the states," not because it would by itself magically put an 
end to unjust treatment of the Negro.73 Section 1 might make it pos-
sible for Congress subsequently to complete the reconstruction of 
the South, but it did not by itself effect that reconstruction. 
In the meantime, there was the immediate problem of preserving 
Republican control of Congress, for its own sake as well as to carry 
through with appropriate legislation that might ultimately accom-
plish the aims of § 1. Section 2 would provide a means for preserving 
that control and for quieting complaints that the present exclusion 
of southern representatives was not constitutional. If the southern 
states refused to enfranchise the Negro without waiting for the en-
forcement of supplementary legislation or court orders (which 
might never come), 74 they could at least be stripped of thirty-seven 
representatives and, as Stevens said, reduced to "a hopeless minority 
in the national Government." 
This view of § 2 as discussed by Stevens makes fully as much sense 
of his remarks as the preemptive view proffered by Mr. Justice 
Harlan. It is, moreover, in keeping with Stevens' general character 
as a confirmed Radical who regarded the Confederate states as con-
quered provinces, not to be trusted or indulged.75 It is more consist-
ent with the importance he expressly attached to the maintenance 
of Radical control of the Congress. To borrow a metaphor that both 
73 Note that several members of the House had expressed the view that sys-
tematic disfranchisement was already subject to congressional correction which 
they regretted had not been forthcoming. See also the views of Stevens and Bout-
well, text infra, at notes 101 and 102. Throughout the consideration of the Four-
teenth Amendment, no particular reliance was placed on the prospect that the 
courts would apply its provisions in a self-executing fashion, unaided by supple-
mentary legislation and executive enforcement. The Radical distrust of the courts 
is traceable in part to their disappointment with Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 
393 (1857). 
74 See notes 72 and 73 supra. 
75 See, e.g., GLoBE at 72-75; KENDRICK at 155--69; WooDBURN, LIFE oF THADDEUS 
STEVENS (1913); WooDLEY, THADDEUS STEVENS (1934); CURRENT, OLD THAD STEVENS 
(1942). 
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Bingham and Fessenden had employed on the same issue, it suggests 
that § 2 no more recognizes a right of the states to disfranchise 
Negroes under § 1, than a separate statute forfeiting the right to 
vote of a criminal convicted of larceny recognizes his right to com-
mit larceny. 
On January 31, H.R. No. 51 went to the Senate.76 The issue of 
preemption was again raised, and the record of debate again discloses 
a lack of common understanding among the senators. Senator Sum-
ner maintained that Congress had the power and duty immediately 
to enfranchise the Negro under Article I, § 2, Article IV, § 4, the 
Thirteenth Amendment, the war power, the power over federal ter-
ritories, and an inherent power derived from the sense of the Dec-
laration of Independence, the Preamble, and the Constitution com-
bined.77 In his remarks of March 7, he expressed his view that 
H.R. No. 51 would appear to constitutionalize state disfranchise-
ment of Negroes.78 Fessenden, the Senate chairman of the Joint 
Committee (of which Sumner was not a member), disagreed on 
both counts. He held that currendy the states had exclusive author-
ity over suffrage qualifications,79 but he emphatically denied that 
H.R. No. 51 preempted any authority that Congress itself might 
have of that kind: 80 
Opinions differ ... but for the sake of the argument, admit 
that Congress has the power, how in the world does this 
proposition deprive them of any power they have. What is 
the expression? . . . Suppose Congress has the power to de-
cide that the colored people shall vote, does this give it away? 
Does this ~nish it? If it exists in the Constitution today, is 
Congress deprived of the power on account of this prohibi-
tion? Is it affected in the slightest possible degree in any way? 
Every man must see that it is not. 
Senator Yates of Illinois argued that Congress could extend the 
franchise under the Thirteenth Amendment, and he expressed con-
cern that H.R. No. 51 might deprive them of that power.81 Wilson 
of Massachusetts disagreed on the power of Congress, but he was as 
emphatic as Fessenden that H.R. No. 51 did not affect that question 
in any way.82 On March 9, Yates reiterated his position that Con-
76 GLOBE at 520. 
77 I d. at 673-87, 1228-31. 
78 I d. at 1228. 
79 I d. at 704. 
80 I d. at 1280. 
81 I d. at 1255-56. 
82 I d. at 1256. 
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gress could and should act to enfranchise the Negro under Article I, 
§ 2 (election "by the people") and the Thirteenth Amendment. 
Again he protested against H.R. No. 51 to the extent that it seemed 
to him to recognize the right of the states to disfranchise these 
people.83 Again Fessenden denied any such implication, emphasizing 
that H.R. No. 51 merely provided a special penalty and did not 
acknowledge any right of the states to do the thing for which they 
would be penalized. 84 Still the question persisted, with Senator 
Stewart of Nevada asserting that while he disagreed with Sumner's 
view of congressional power, he agreed with Sumner's impression of 
H.R. No. 51: 85 "I do not think he is right; but I think if he is right, 
it [H.R. No. 51] takes away the right." 
Finally, on March 9, the same day that much of this discussion 
occurred, H.R. No. 51 was put to a vote. It lost by 25 to 22, falling 
short of the necessary two-thirds support for a constitutional amend-
ment.86 Fessenden and Wilson voted for it, and were to vote for it 
again when modified H.R. No. 51 reappeared as§ 2 of the packaged 
Fourteenth Amendment in May. Stewart, Sumner, and Yates voted 
against it, but were subsequently to vote in favor of the packaged 
Fourteenth Amendment. Senator Wade, another who believed that 
Congress might already possess authority to enfranchise Negroes, 
voted for it. 87 
Immediately after H.R. No. 51 failed to secure the necessary two-
thirds vote in the Senate, Sherman of Ohio reopened the issue. On 
March 12 Sumner moved to amend H.R. No. 51 by substituting the 
following penalty provision: 88 
Provided: That whenever male citizens of the United States 
over the age of twenty-one years shall be excluded from the 
elective franchise in any State, except for participation in re-
bellion, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in 
proportion which the number thus excluded bears to the 
whole number of male citizens of the United States over the 
age of twenty-one years in such State. 
In view of the similarity between Sumner's proposal and § 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as finally adopted, and its contrast with 
H.R. No. 51, which provided for a reduction-of-representation 
83]d. at 1278-79. 
84]d. at 1279. 
85]d. at 1280. 
86]d. at 1289. 
87 !d. App. at 122. 
88]d. at 1289. 
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basis only for exclusions based on race or color, it may be of interest 
to learn why Sumner modified H.R. No. 51 as he did: 89 
With the indulgence of the Senate, I will merely call 
attention to the fact that that proposition is not open, I think, 
as will appear on its face, to any evasions; in the second place, 
it contains no words which can imply any recognition of in-
equality of rights; and in the third place, it contains no words 
which can imply any recognition of the right of a State to 
disfranchise on account of color or race; and therefore it 
seems to meet the objections which were adduced against the 
pending proposition. 
Sumner's remarks were almost the last references to H.R. No. 51 
in Congress, until the bill reappeared in only slightly altered dress as 
§ 2 of H.R. No. 127, the packaged Fourteenth Amendment worked 
out by the Joint Committee between April21 and 28.90 On April30, 
Stevens and Fessenden reported H.R. No. 127 to both Houses.91 
The first two sections provided: 92 
89 Id. at 1321. 
llO See KENDRICK 82-120. The proposal for a package amendment was put forward 
in the committee by Stevens, on the suggestion of Robert Dale Owen. Owen's 
amendment provided: 
"Section 1. No discrimination shall be made by any State nor by the United 
States as to the civil rights of persons because of race, color or previous condi-
tion of servitude. 
"Section 2. From and after the fourth day of July in the year 1876 no discrimi-
nation shall be made by any State nor by the United States, as to the enjoyment, 
by classes of persons, of the right of suffrage, because of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude. 
"Section 3. Until the fourth day of July, 1876, no class of persons, as to the 
right of any of whom to suffrage, discrimination shall be made by any State, because 
of race, color or previous condition of servitude, shall be included in the basis of 
representation. 
"Section 4. Debts incurred in aid of insurrection or of war against the Union, 
and claims of compensation for loss of involuntary service or labor, shall not be 
paid by any State nor by the United States. 
"Section 5. Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article." 
See Owen, Political Results from the Varioloid, 35 ATLANTIC Mo:r..'THLY 660-70 
(1875); JMms, op. cit. supra note 8, at 100-15. 
Ill GLOBE at 2265, 2286. 
92 The first section was proposed in the Joint Committee by Bingham, on April 
21. It was initially approved by a vote of 10 to 2. On April 25, it was dropped 
on a motion of Senator Williams, by a vote of 7 to 5. On April 28, however, 
Bingham proposed it again, as § 1, and it was approved by a vote of 10 to 3. 
KENDRICK 82-107. It essentially repeats the phraseology of H.R. No. 63 and its 
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Section 1. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the 
several States which may be included within this Union 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole 
number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not ta.'l:ed. 
But whenever in any State the elective franchise shall be 
denied to any portion of its male citizens not less than twenty-
one years of age, or in any way abridged, except for partici-
pation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation 
in such State shall be reduced in the proportion which the 
number of male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
such male citizens not less than twenty-one years of age. 
[1965 
We have already examined Stevens' remarks of May 8, conclud-
ing that he was essentially noncommittal with respect to the rela-
tionship of § 2 to § 1, and observing that he had previously dis-
avowed any preemptive effect of H.R. No. 51.93 The other state-
ment on which Mr. Justice Harlan relied so heavily was that of 
Bingham, and here, to be sure, there is the statement that § 2 pre-
cluded the application of § 1 to voting rights: 94 
The amendment does not give, as the second section shows, 
the power to Congress of regulating suffrage in the several 
States. 
antecedent versions which the Joint Committee had considered since January 20, 
and which the House had been debating since February 13. See notes 46 and 66 
supra. The major change is that Bingham's § 1 of H.R. No. 127 appears to address 
itself to the states, whereas H.R. No. 63 was a general grant of authority to Con-
gress. This aspect of H.R. No. 63 met with the objection in the House that such 
a provision would seem to displace the general police power of the states. See 
remarks of Hale, GLOBE, at 1063-66, 1094-95. 
The second section was proposed in the Joint Committee by Williams, on April 
28, and approved the same day. KENDRICK at 1022. It is closest to Sumner's pro-
posal offered in the Senate on March 12. See text at note 89 supra. It differs essen-
tially from H.R. No. 51 in but two respects: (1) the reduction of basis of repre-
sentation is to be made for disfranchisement of adult male citizens, and not merely 
for disfranchisement because of race; (2) the reduction in basis is to be made 
ouly in proportion to the number disfranchised and not in proportion to the 
whole number of a class even if only one of the class is disfranchised. These 
modifications respond to objections to H.R. No. 51, earlier expressed in both 
Houses. See note 68 supra. 
93 See text supra at notes 63-75. 94 GLoBE at 2542; 377 U.S. at 593. 
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The second section excludes the conclusion that by the 
first section suffrage is subjected to congressional law; save, 
indeed, with this exception, that as the right in the people of 
each State to a republican government and to choose their 
Representatives in Congress is of the guarantees of the Con-
stitution, by this amendment a remedy might be given 
direcrly for a case supposed by Madison, where treason might 
change a State government from a republican to a despotic 
government, and thereby deny suffrage to the people. 
In the whole context, including Bingham's earlier asseverations of 
January 25,95 this is a puzzling statement. Does it mean that§ 2limits 
§ 1, but that it does not limit the broad authority over suffrage that 
Bingham had insisted Congress already possessed under Article I, 
§ 2, and Article IV, § 4? If it limited the one, why did it not limit 
the other? Is it merely because of the close juxtaposition of §§ 1 and 
2, but the textual separation of § 2 from earlier provisions in the 
Constitution? Is he maintaining, perhaps, that while earlier sections 
of the Constitution theoretically restrict state power over suffrage, 
§ 2 provides an additional, or even an exclusive, means for enforcing 
those restrictions? Or does he mean something else still, viz., that § 2 
limits the application of § 1 over voting rights, save with this excep-
tion, that where a state disfranchises so substantial a portion of its 
citizens that it ceases to become a republican form of government, 
§ 1 itself grants to Congress the power to correct that abuse? 
Each of these may be a permissible constrUction of Bingham's 
remarks. vVhatever their trnly intended meaning, however, they 
were not the only remarks made during the debate in the House on 
H.R. No. 127. And, contrary to Mr. Justice Harlan's impression, it 
was not trUe that "every speaker on the resolution, with a single 
doubtful exception, assumed without question that, as Mr. Bingham 
said, supra, 'the second section excludes the conclusion that by the 
first section suffrage is subjected to congressional law.' "96 
On May 5, Representative Phelps of Maryland spoke against the 
acceptability of§§ 1 and 5 because they "covertly'' authorized a law 
to impose "Negro suffrage and eligibility ... over the whole coun-
try."97 On May 8, Representative Niblack, who opposed the 
Amendment, announced that he would shortly propose a new sec-
tion to provide that "nothing ... shall be so constrUed as to authorize 
a:; See note 61 supra and accompanying text. 
96 377 U.S. at 599. 97 GLOBE at 2398. 
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Congress to regulate or control the elective franchise within any 
State .... "98 He was immediately followed by Boyer of Pennsyl-
vania, who also viewed § 1 as a threat to state suffrage authority.99 
Boyer felt that it was § 1, rather than § 2, that might indirecdy 
secure political equality. 
Finally, on May 10, the very day on which H.R. No. 127 was 
approved by the House by 128 to 37, Representative Rogers of 
New Jersey delivered some prophetic remarks on§ 1. Rogers is the 
"single doubtful exception" to whom Mr. Justice Harlan referred. 
Presumably he is "doubtful" only because he was a Democratic 
representative ardently opposed to the Radical Reconstruction Plan. 
On the other hand, he was also a member of the Joint Committee 
that had assembled H.R. No. 127, and thus his views may warrant 
more than passing attention. Speaking of§ 1, he said: 100 
What are privileges and immunities? Why, sir, all the rights 
we have under the laws of the country are embraced under 
the definition of privileges and immunities. The right to 
vote is a privilege. The right to marry is a privilege. The 
right to contract is a privilege. The right to be a juror is a 
privilege. The right to be a judge or President of the United 
States is a privilege. I hold if that ever becomes a part of the 
fundamental law of the land it will prevent any State from 
refusing to allow anything to anyboay embraced under this 
term of privileges and immunities. 
Stevens, who had not adverted specifically to suffrage under § 1 
when he outlined the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment on May 
8, soon sought to fulfill Rogers' prophecy about the right to vote as 
a "privilege" of citizenship. Less than two years later, on the heels 
of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Stevens delivered 
the following defense of a bill to preclude the states from denying 
the right to vote on account of race, relying on the language of 
§ 1:101 
Since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment . . . I 
have no doubt of our full power to regulate the elective fran-
chise, so far as it regards the whole nation, in every State of 
the Union, which, when tried, I hope, will be so formed as 
to be beneficial to the nation, just to every citizen, and carry 
98 Id. at 2465. 99 Id. at 2467. 100 ld. at 2538. 
101 CoNG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1966-67 (1868). The bill Stevens endorsed 
was H.R. No. 126, introduced on July 11, 1867. CoNG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 591 ( 1867). 
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out the great designs of the framers of the Government, 
according to their views expressed in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence .... 
The fourteenth amendment, now so happily adopted, settles 
the whole question and places every American citizen on a 
perfect equality so far as merely national rights and questions 
are concerned .... 
If by the amended Constitution every American citizen is 
entitled to equal privileges with every other American citizen, 
and if every American citizen in any of the States should be 
found entitled to impartial and universal suffrage with every 
other American in any State, then it follows as an inevitable 
conclnsion that suffrage throughout this nation is impartial 
and universal so far as every human being, without regard 
to race or color, shall be found concerned, and so far as it 
affects the whole nation. 
In Stevens' retrospective view (which must, of course, be discounted 
to that e:ll.'tent), the Fourteenth Amendment had not merely left in-
tact whatever power over suffrage Congress previously possessed. 
Through §§ 1 and 5, it had empowered Congress to invalidate state 
suffrage disqualifications based on race or color. 
On the whole record, in any case, it seems quite impossible to 
conclude that there was a clear and deliberate understanding in the 
House that § 2 was the sole source of national authority to protect 
voting rights, or that it expressly recognized the states' power to 
deny or abridge the right to vote. It may be closer to the mark to 
suggest that: ( 1) Section 2 left the disputed respective powers of the 
state and federal government over the franchise unaffected. (2) It 
was concerned with overcoming the apportionment formula of 
Article I, the better to assure the power of Congress to reduce 
southern representation in the House and Electoral College. 
Whether this is the "correct" view or not, it is considerably more 
modest than that put forward by Stevens, its principal author, in 
1868. It is far more modest, too, than the interpretation insisted 
upon by Boutwell in 1869. (Boutwell was a member of the Joint 
Committee that reported H.R. No. 51 and H.R. No. 127.) During 
House consideration of both bills, Boutwell had little to say re-
specting their effect on suffrage. On January 23, 1869, however, he 
defended the constitutionality of a bill guaranteeing Negro suffrage 
in language not dissimilar to that of the subsequently promulgated 
Fifteenth Amendment. Boutwell rested his bill on the bases of 
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Article I, §§ 2 and 4, Article IV, § 4, and§§ 1 and 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Speaking of these last two provisions, he said: 102 
If there were any doubt remaining in the mind of any person 
as to the power of Congress over this whole subject, as de-
rived from the three provisions of the original text of the Con-
stitution to which I have referred, I believe that every doubt 
must disappear upon an analysis of the fourteenth amend-
ment .... 
MR. NICHOLSON. I desire to inquire whether, when the four-
teenth article ... was under discussion in the Thirty-Ninth 
Congress, the gentleman himself, and other members of his 
party who took part in that discussion, did not concede the 
distinction between civil and political rights . . . upon the 
class intended to be benefited? 
MR. BouTWELL. I have no recollection of anything of that 
sort, though it may be that some persons did make such a 
concession. I believe that gentlemen on the other side of the 
House generally claimed that it would confer such rights; 
and I cannot say but that some members on this side of the 
House may have disavowed that construction; but I was not 
one of them .... 
Then, sir, by the fifth section of the fourteenth article, 
Congress has power to enforce by appropriate legislation the 
provisions of the article. Does anybody doubt-in the presence 
of this • • • unlimited power under the fourteenth article 
to legislate so as to secure to citizens of the United States the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of any one of the States-
does anybody doubt our duty? ... 
I come now to the second section [of the Fourteenth 
Amendment], upon which I know reliance will be placed 
by the opponents of the bill .... 
If gentleman will consider these two sections together they 
will see how entirely in harmony they are with each other, 
and how wholly unsupported is the doctrine that there is in 
this second section any concession to a State to abridge or 
deny to a citizen the right to vote. By the second section there 
is a political penalty for doing that which in the first section 
it is declared the State has no right to do. . . . 
It is here provided that there shall be no abridgement of 
the privileges and immunities of citizens; and in the second 
section there is a penalty provided for a State that disregards 
the inhibition. We were then acting in the presence of the 
fact that many States of the Union were doing that which 
the first section declared they hacl no right to do. It was 
102 CoNG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. SSS-60 (1869). 
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uncertain when Congress would exercise the power conferred 
by the fifth section of the fourteenth amendment, and in order 
that the States should not take advantage of their own wrong 
during the period while Congress might be inactive a penalty 
was provided. We knew that Kentucky, Maryland, and Dela-
ware were doing what they were inhibited from doing by 
the first section of the article, and we said that they should 
suffer in representation for so doing. Power was given to 
Congress to remedy this evil, and that power Congress is now 
called upon to exercise. . .. 
MR. ELDRIDGE. . . . The question I desire to put is this: 
whether there is not in that amendment a distinct recognition 
of the existence of the power to regulate suffrage in the States 
themselves? 
MR. BouTwELL. Oh, no; not the least. . . . If the right to 
vote for certain officers be denied or abridged, then certain 
political consequences follow; but in the first section there is 
a distinct declaration that this cannot lawfully be done. We 
only recognized the existing facts. We knew there were some 
States in which the wrong existed. It might require time be-
fore Congress could exercise its powers under the fifth sec-
tion, and the country meant to say that while this state of 
things continued-a state of things unjust and contrary to the 
Constitution-the States should not have the benefit of their 
wrongdoing. 
In respect to the Senate debate in May, 1866, on H.R. No. 127, it 
is quite true, as Mr. Justice Harlan noted, that Senator Howard said 
of§ 2 that it "does not recognize the authority of the United States 
over the question of suffrage in the several States at all," and that it 
"leaves the right to regulate the elective franchise still with the 
States, and does not meddle with that right."103 It should be noted, 
however, that these remarks do not assert that § 2 precludes the 
exercise of any other constitutional power Congress possesses over 
the franchise, i.e., Howard did not take the position that § 2 estab-
lishes the exclusive authority of the states over suffrage. It is perfect-
ly unremarkable that he would observe that § 2 did not "recognize" 
the authority of the United States over suffrage, if by that he meant 
only what in fact he said: that § 2 itself did not "establish" or 
"grant" any new national authority over suffrage. 
It may still be the more reasonable inference, however, that in say-
ing that § 2 "leaves the right to regulate the elective franchise still 
1oa GwnE at 2766. 
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with the States" and that it "does not recognize the authority of the 
United States over the question of suffrage," Howard meant that it 
precluded any other provision from being regarded as establishing 
any national authority over suffrage. If so, however, his position 
must simply be construed as contrary to the position asserted by 
Fessenden earlier, that H.R. No. 51, the forerunner of § 2, had no 
such effect. And it is no particular source of wonder that Howard 
would not have agreed with Fessenden, because on March 9, the 
day Fessenden was most emphatic respecting the noncommittal 
character of H.R. No. 51, Howard was absent from the Senate.104 
Moreover, his own feeling that the states could regulate the fran-
chise exclusively as they saw fit stands in contrast with that of 
Yates, Wade, and Sumner in the Senate, and at least nine members 
of the House, all of whom had declared at the time that the states 
had no such exclusive prerogative. 
The sum of the record respecting § 2, then, seems insufficient to 
support an inference that even though its language is utterly non-
committal on whether Congress could exercise authority fiowing 
from other constitutional provisions to broaden the franchise, it was 
nonetheless clearly understood at the time to preempt any such 
authority or preclude the exercise of that authority. Whether such 
authority might have been elsewhere in the Constitution or in the 
Fourteenth Amendment itself, in§§ 1 and 5, must consequendy be a 
function of the language and understanding of those sections-an 
issue not foreclosed by § 2. 
II. THE OPEN TEXTURE OF SECTION ONE 
"Should not the search for congressional purpose ... proper-
ly be twofold? One inquiry should be directed at the congressional 
understanding of the immediate effect of the enactment on condi-
tions then present. Another should aim to discover what if any 
thought was given to the long-range effect, under future circum-
stances, of provisions necessarily intended for permanence."105 Pro-
fessor Bickel's disarming question respecting "original understand-
ings" in general applies as much to the issue of state power over suf-
frage as it did to state power over segregation. For there was, before 
the Thirty-ninth Congress, an even clearer choice of alternatives on 
104Jd. at 1280. 
105 Bickel, supra note 11, at 59. 
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this issue than on the dimly perceived issue of per se racial segrega-
tion, about which Professor Bickel was writing. The :first alternative 
was put forward by Boutwell of Massachusetts on December 13, 
1865, very early in the :first session of the Congress. It was to pro-
pose an amendment "that no State shall make any distinction in the 
exercise of the elective franchise on account of race or color."106 Or, 
on the assumption that Congress already possessed the necessary au-
thority, to attempt the same task by statute, as repeatedly urged by 
Senator Sumner from December 20 on.107 The same type of pro-
posal, again in the form of an amendment, was proposed by Senator 
Henderson of Missouri: 108 "No State, in prescribing the qualifica-
tions requisite for electors therein shall discriminate against any per-
son on account of color or race." This alternative, boldly to con-
front the limited and specific issue of equal suffrage for Negroes 
alone, and to dispose of it by action immediately invalidating con-
trary state laws, was supported by a number of Senate Radicals, in-
cluding Yates, Sumner, Wade, Williams, Henderson, Howe, Po-
land, Pomeroy, Brown, and Chandler.109 It was deliberately enter-
tained by the Joint Committee when, on January 12, the committee 
considered the following proposed amendment: 110 
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among 
the several States within this Union, according to the respec-
tive numbers of citizens of the United States in each State; 
and all provisions in the Constitution or laws of any State, 
106 GLoBE at 49. 
107 Id. at 92,674, 765, 1228-31, 1288. 1os I d. at 702. 
109 On March 9, Yates proposed the following substitute for H.R. No. 51: "That 
no State or Territory of the United States shall by any constitution, law, or other 
regulation whatever, heretofore in force or hereafter to be adopted, make or 
enforce in any way, or in any manner recognize any distinction between citizens 
of the United States or of any State or Territory, on account of race or color, 
or previous condition of slavery; and that hereafter all citizens, without distinc-
tion of race, color, or previous condition of slavery, shall be protected in the 
full and equal enjoyment and exercise of all their civil and political rightS, in-
cluding the right of suffrage." By a vote of 7 to 38, the amendment failed. Yates, 
Sumner, Wade, Brown, Chandler, Pomeroy, and Williams voted for it. ld. at 
1287. 
The same day, Sumner attempted to amend H.R. No. 51 by substituting: "And 
the elective franchise shall not be denied or abridged in any State on account of 
race or color." His amendment lost on a vote of 8 to 38. Brown, Henderson, 
Howe, Poland, Pomeroy, Sumner, Wade, and Yates voted for it. Id. at 1288. 
110 See note 46 supra and accompanying text. 
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whereby any distinctions made in political or civil rights or 
privileges on account of race, creed or color, shall be inopera-
tive and void. 
[1965 
The decision was made, however, not to propose a limited, single-
purpose amendment; not to advertise the particular issue of Negro 
suffrage and to dispose of it through a provision instantly invalidat-
ing the laws of all states where equal suffrage regardless of race was 
denied. The reluctance of the Republicans bluntly to dispose of the 
issue in this fashion is readily explainable; there was not sufficient 
prospect that the necessary number of states would ratify such an 
amendment. 
There were, in 1866, but five states in the nation that permitted 
Negroes to vote on equal terms with whites: Maine, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Together, these 
states contained a mere 6 per cent of the northern Negro population. 
New York also permitted Negro suffrage, but only for those pos-
sessed of at least a $250 freehold estate, an added "qualification" that 
whites were not obliged to satisfy. No other state permitted Negroes 
to vote, regardless of qualification. Moreover, in late 1865, shortly 
before the Thirty-ninth Congress convened, Connecticut, Minne-
sota, and Wisconsin voted down impartial suffrage by popular refer-
endum.111 The Territory of Colorado defeated a referendum for 
impartial suffrage by a wide margin in September, 1865, and was, 
nevertheless, admitted to the Union by Congress in 1866.112 
The admission of Colorado, with its ban on Negro voting, fol-
lowed the admission of Nevada, which had a similar ban, and was, in 
turn followed by the readmission of Tennessee on July 24, 1866.113 
The readmission of Tennessee was accomplished, moreover, with 
complete awareness that its general assembly had, on June 5, 1865, 
restricted the franchise to white males only.114 Indeed, all these facts 
were well known to the Congress, and were gleefully recited by 
some of the Democrats who challenged the Republicans to dare to 
make an issue of Negro suffrage.115 It was also true that after 1860 
111 See GILLETIE, op. cit. supra note 8; }AMES, op. cit. supra note 8, at 13; 
MURRAY, RE-EXAMINATION OF THE RooTs OF RAciAL Crusis (1965). 
112 GLOBE at 2135-80, 2373. 113 Id. App. at 430. 
114Report of the ]oint C011mzittee on Recomtruction, H.R. REP. No. 30, 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess. Part I, pp. 30--31 (1866). 
115 GLOBE at 245-46, 2135-80, 2489, 2985. 
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the Republican platforms had discreetly skirted the issue of Negro 
suffrage. 
All these things and more had a conspicuous and significant influ-
ence on the Thirty-ninth Congress. On June 22, 1865, for instance, 
Senator Howard had written to Sumner, saying:116 "The Negro 
11mst vote .... It is our only security and the only means of making 
emancipation effectual. He must vote. . . ." He was confident of 
Congress' power to extend the franchise at least in the South, and he 
urged that it be done "at the earliest possible day so as to put an end 
to this executive reconstruction which seems likely to restore slavery 
and bring rebels into congress." Yet, in reporting the consolidated 
Fourteenth Amendment, the same Senator Howard was to insist on 
May 23, 1866, that "the first section of the proposed amendment 
does not by itself give to either of these classes the right of vot-
ing."117 In reporting his conversation with Stevens, leading to 
Stevens' willingness to bring his proposed amendment to the atten-
tion of the Joint Committee on April21, 1866, Robert Dale Owen 
quoted Stevens as saying: 118 "We haven't a majority, either in our 
committee or in Congress, for immediate suffrage; and I don't be-
lieve the states have yet advanced so far that they would be willing 
to ratify it." Stevens reiterated his lack of confidence in the willing-
ness of the states to ratify any proposal immediately to enfranchise 
the Negro. While he insisted that H.R. No. 51 "grants [the states] 
no right" of disfranchisement, he declared that the states would not 
adopt any proposal stronger than the one he was offering.119 Typi-
cal, too, was the remark of Senator Wilson, speaking in favor of 
H.R. No. 51 on March 8. Like Stevens, he denied that H.R. No. 51 
would preempt any power Congress might otherwise have to regu-
late the franchise. He favored an enfranchising amendment but 
would not support any proposed amendment clearly and immediate-
ly designed by itself to enfranchise the Negro, because it could not 
be adopted.120 
In addition to those who declared against such a proposal on the 
grounds of expediency, there were those who placed their unwill-
ingness to act on a more lofty basis, namely, that the states should be 
free to decide this question for themselves, as many had believed 
116 Quoted in }AMES, op. cit. supra note 8, at 13. 
117 GLOBE at 2766. 119 GLOBE at 536. 
118 Owen, supra note 90, at 662. 12o I d. at 1256. 
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they were constitutionally entitled to do. A representative combina-
tion of reasons appears in the remarks of Senator Doolittle of Wis-
consin, in the course of arguing in favor of admitting Colorado in 
spite of the fact that Negroes were not allowed to vote. After de-
claring that he personally favored equal Negro suffrage, Doolittle 
added: 121 
. . . there was another thing that I advocated, and it was 
this: that each State had a right for itself to determine the 
question, and that the Federal Government had no right or 
constitutional power to impose on a State negro suffrage; 
that the right of a State to aetermine that question for itself 
was one of the reserved rights of every State, under the 
Constitution. . .. 
The question the gentleman asked was, whether the states 
will accept a proposition to amend the Constitution giving 
negro suffrage. I answer no, sir, they will not. Join the issue as 
soon as you please here or elsewhere, and out of New England 
there are not three States in this Union, neither Nevada nor 
Colorado, nor any of the new States or the old States that will 
vote for an amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States by which negro suffrage shall be imposed upon the 
States. 
There were, too, expressions of regret, when the consolidated 
amendment was before Congress, that it did not establish broad suf-
frage in the United States. Representative Garfield with a great 
rhetorical flourish complained of the absence of such provisions, but 
concluded pragmatically: 122 "But I am willing, as I said once before 
in this presence, when I cannot get all I wish to take what I can get." 
With all of this, then, the alternative of proposing a blunt amend-
ment banning Negro disenfranchisement was emphatically rejected. 
With all of it, too, the case can safely be made that there was an 
original understanding that § 1 of the proposed Fourteenth Amend-
ment would not itself immediately invalidate state suffrage laws 
severely restricting the right to vote. With all of it, however, we 
cannot safely declare that there was also a clear, uniform under-
standing that the open-ended phrases of§ !-"privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States ... life, liberty, or property ... 
the equal protection of the laws" -would foreclose a different ap-
plication in the future. Most especially is this so to the extent that 
l21Jd. at 2143. l22Jd. at 2462. 
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legislative action to invalidate state laws barring Negroes from vot-
ing was avoided as a matter of expediency, i.e., from fear that such 
an amendment would not be ratified and that its Republican spon-
sors would be turned out of office at the next congressional election. 
The question whether the original understanding was itself in-
tended equally to bind the indefinite future becomes more lively 
when we note that the Thirty-ninth Congress did not adopt a 
second alternative: to accomplish specific, narrowly defined ends by 
producing an equally specific and narrowly defined amendment 
that, by clear language, could never be applied to suffrage. The 
failure to pursue that alternative, moreover, could scarcely have 
been inadvertent. Mter all, Stevens himself had spoken of equal pro-
tection in so broad a fashion that the ultimate reach of the clause 
could not safely be foreseen: 123 
Whatever law protects the white man shall afford "equal" 
protection to the black man. Whatever means of redress is 
afforded to one shall be afforded to all. Whatever law allows 
the white man to testify in court shall allow the man of color 
to do the same. . . . Unless the Constitution should re-
strain them those States will all, I fear, keep up this dis-
crimination, and crush to death the hated freedmen. 
Several of the Democrats declared, moreover, that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause would eventually be applied to suffrage. In spite 
of this, the Republicans declined to limit the language of § 1 to avoid 
such an application, or to add a qualifying provision such as that 
suggested by Niblack, that "nothing ... shall be so construed as to 
authorize Congress to regulate or control the election franchise 
within any State." 
All this might readily be passed off as a mere unwillingness to 
clutter the Amendment with unnecessary language to overcome a 
frivolous and unfounded objection by the Democrats, and as not in 
the least detracting from an understanding that nothing in § 1 could 
ever apply to suffrage. Yet, there is such a striking difference be-
tween the Republicans' response to criticisms of the open text of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and their response to identical criticisms of 
the Civil Rights Act, adopted in the same session, that the question 
is left open to a different view. 
For one thing, it would be inaccurate to assume that no one had 
123 See note 69 supra and accompanying text. 
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any reason to take seriously predictions that the enabling clause, § 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, in combination with the broad 
phraseology of§ 1, might someday be used to reach suffrage. Sec-
tion 5 is identical in language to § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
and this same session of Congress had based its authority to enact the 
Civil Rights Act on the proposition that that Act was "appropriate 
legislation" to enforce the mere ban on "slavery" in § 1 of the Thir-
teenth Amendment.124 The Civil Rights Act, on the bare strength of 
the Thirteenth Amendment, had gone leagues beyond forbidding 
laws keeping persons in actual bondage.125 It had given Negroes 
who had never been slaves as well as those who were no longer 
slaves equal rights to make and enforce contracts, to acquire, use, 
and dispose of property, to enjoy equal status in all legal proceed-
ings, and to enjoy equal protection of law enforcement against any-
one attempting to interfere with these equal rights. It made it a fed-
eral criminal offense for anyone acting under law or custom to 
interfere with these rights. It provided for removal to the federal 
courts of cases in which the state courts might fail to recognize these 
rights. It provided for federal troops to safeguard these rights, and 
it provided for a substantial list of federal civil remedies against pri-
vate and official interference with these rights. In short, the Thirty-
ninth Congress relied upon the open text of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment (by no means as open, however, as that of the Fourteenth 
Amendment) to enact what were the precursors of civil rights 
legislation still on the books.126 Thus, the same Congress that adopted 
the open text of§ 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and combined it 
with the legislative enforcement provision of § 5 had-in the same 
session-already used the less "permissive" text of the Thirteenth 
Amendment to render an extraordinarily expansive "understanding" 
of what was forbidden by the ban on slavery. It would be quite un-
reasonable to assume, therefore, that the complaints of the Demo-
crats against the even more vaguely worded provisions of § 1 in the 
Fourteenth Amendment were baseless. And, fresh from their own 
124 Senator Trumbull, the author of the Civil Rights Act, ell.'plicitly rested its 
constitutionality on the Thirteenth Amendment. GLOBE at 474. See also id. at 602, 
1151, 1159, 1268-69. 
12:> Act of April 9, 1866, c.31, 14 Stat. 27. The ten long sections of the Act are 
also printed at GLoBE, App. 315-16. 
126 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1987-92 (1964); 18 U.S.C. § 242; 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1443; 10 u.s.c. § 332. 
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experience in developing new applications of the Thirteenth 
Amendment on the very heels of its ratification, the Radicals could 
scarcely have failed to foresee that the still broader contours of the 
Fourteenth Amendment would offer even greater possibilities for 
the future. 
There is still more significance to the concurrent history of the 
Civil Rights Act. As the bill (S. No. 1) was introduced on January 5 
by Senator Trumbull and reported to the Senate from his own Judi-
ciary Committee on January 12, the particular specification of rights 
to be protected by the bill was preceded by a broader and more 
general clause:127 
There shall be no discrimination in the civil rights or im-
munities among the inhabitants of any State or Territory of 
the United States on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of slavery; but the inhabitants of every race and 
color, without regard to any previous conditions of slavery 
or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have 
the same right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be 
parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, 
hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and 
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security 
of person and property, and shall be subject to like punish-
ment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, 
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary not-
withstanding. 
Up to a point, the subsequent legislative history of the Civil 
Rights Act was entirely parallel to the treatment of§ 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Thus, in leading off the discussion on January 
29, Trumbull declared that his bill had "nothing to do with political 
rights."128 In arguing for the bill on February 1, Senator Hender-
son e:l\.-pressed his understanding that the bill would not admit 
Negroes to the ballot box.129 The following day, Trumbull again 
declared: 130 "The bill is applicable exclusively to civil rights. It does 
not propose to regulate the political rights of individuals; it has 
nothing to do with the right of suffrage, or any other political 
"h " ng t •••• 
Saulsbury of Delaware, however, was not satisfied with these 
assurances. He thought that the phrase "civil rights" in the opening 
127 GLOBE at 129, 211. See also id. at 474. 
128Jd. at 476. 129Jd. at 571. 130 I d. at 599. 
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sentence was susceptible of embracing the right to vote and that the 
provision "[there] shall be no discrimination in the civil rights ... 
on account of race" might be taken as an attempt to strilre down 
state laws restricting suffrage to whites. To clarify the matter, he 
proposed to amend the bill by adding, after the words "civil rights," 
"except the right to vote in the States." His amendment lost 12 to 
33, after Trumbull opposed the amendment: 131 
. . . that is a political privilege, not a civil right. This 
bill relates to civil rights only, and I do not want to bring 
up the question of negro suffrage in the bill. I hope the Senator 
will not persist in any such amendment. 
Thus far, the treatment of the open texture of the civil rights 
statute was the same as that respecting §1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment: i.e., in spite of complaints that it might lead to future protec-
tion of voting rights, the proponents refused to adopt an amendment 
to preclude that effect, even while denying that such an effect was 
intended. In the House, however, there was a different result. In 
spite of declarations that the bill would not affect voting rights, 132 
even Bingham was not satisfied. He moved to strilre out the opening 
general phrase, pardy because he thought the broad phrase "civil 
rights" embraced "political rights," and he doubted both the wis-
dom and constitutionality of legislating with respect to the fran-
chise:133 
I submit with all respect that the term "political rights" is 
only a limitation of the term "civil rights," and by general 
acceptation signifies that class of civil rights which are more 
direcdy exercised by the citizen in connection with the 
government of his country. If this be so, are not political 
rights all embraced in the term "civil rights," and must it not 
of necessity be so interpreted? 
Shellabarger of Ohio immediately "defended" the bill, saying that 
the civil rights to be protected were only those subsequendy named 
in the bill itsel£.134 Then, an attempt by Bingham to amend the bill 
by deleting the phrase "civil rights" was defeated, but a vote to re-
commit the bill to the House Judiciary Committee carried imme-
diately.135 
131 Zd. at 606. 
132 See the remarks of Representatives Wilson and Thayer on March 1, and 
Wilson and Windom on March 2, 1866. GLOBE at 1117, 1151, 1159. 
133 I d. at 1291. 134 I d. at 1293. 135 Zd. at 1296. 
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On March 13, Wilson of Iowa reported back an amended version. 
The amendment would delete the whole open-ended phrase, "there 
shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities among citi-
zens of the United States in any State or Territory of the United 
States on account of race, color, or previous condition of slavery." 
This, of course, was the phrase previously objected to on the ground 
that it might include the right to vote. Wilson necessarily had these 
objections in mind in explaining the committee's reason for the pro-
posed deletion. He declared: 136 "Some gendemen were apprehensive 
that the words we propose to strike out might give warrant for a 
latitudinarian construction not intended." The amendment was ap-
proved without further debate; the bill was then passed in the 
House, concurred in by the Senate, and subsequenrly approved by 
two-thirds in each House over the President's veto.137 In the debate 
on the bill following the President's veto, it was again pointed out 
that the phrase "civil rights" had been dropped in consideration of 
Bingham's objections that it might have been misunderstood to in-
clude voting rights.138 
The ultimate disposition of the "contest'' over the ambiguity of 
the Civil Rights Act, a statute based on the Thirteenth Amendment 
and designed to be enforced immediately, is thus in striking contrast 
with the response of the Radicals to the same contest over the open 
text of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment and its future-looking 
§ 5. In the former, they responded by deleting the ambiguous phrase 
and by accepting the alternative of enacting a limited bill, specifi-
cally enumerating the particular interests that would receive equal 
protection. In the latter, notwithstanding the still broader phraseol-
ogy of § 1 and equally vigorous complaints that it might eventually 
be applied to voting, no concession was made. The Civil Rights Act 
was, of course, a statute: a law not expected to "endure for ages to 
come." The Fourteenth Amendment was something else again. 
From all this, the basis for deriving the original understanding of 
§ 1, "under future circumstances, of provisions necessarily intended 
for permanence,"130 is perhaps about the same for suffrage as that 
which Professor Bickel determined for per se segregation: 140 
136 !d. at 1366. 
138 !d. at 1837. 
137 !d. at 1367, 1413, 1438, 1679, 1809, 1861. 
130 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,415 (1819). 
140 Bickel, supra note 11, at 62. 
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They [the Moderates] could go forth and honesdy defend 
themselves against charges that on the day after ratification 
Negroes were going to become white men's "social equals," 
marry their daughters, vote in their elections, sit on their 
juries, and attend schools with their children. The Radicals 
. . . obtained what early in the session had seemed a very 
uncertain prize indeed: a firm alliance, under Radical leader-
ship, with the Moderates in the struggle against the President, 
and thus a good, clear chance at increasing and prolonging 
their political power. In the future, the Radicals could, in 
one way or another, put through such further civil rights 
provisions as they thought the country would take, without 
being subject to the sort of effective constitutional objections 
which haunted them when they were forced to operate under 
the thirteenth amendment. 
[1965 
In retrospect, Professor Bickel's analysis is even more attractive 
than when he first offered it. For the primary object of § 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment may now be seen as a significant comple-
ment to the compromise achieved in § 1: as an additional means de-
veloped by the Republicans to increase and prolong their political 
power, and not as an exclusive substitute for putting through such 
further civil rights provisions (including voting) as they thought the 
country would take in the future. 
III. THE IRRELEVANCE oF SECTION Two To MALAPPORTIONMENT 
Reynolds v. Sims was one of several cases holding that a 
particular state law prescribing the method "of constituting state 
legislatures" was invalid under the Equal Protection Clause. Car-
rington v. Rash was a case holding that a particular state law pre-
scribing voter qualifications was invalid under the same clause. In 
the latter case, Mr. Justice Harlan counseled the Court that its prior 
determination to apply the Equal Protection Clause to issues of mal-
apportionment did not warrant an extension of the same clause to 
the separate issue of voter qualifications.141 He thought it significant, 
moreover, that the Court failed to cite any of its reapportionment 
decisions as precedents for its action in Carrington v. Rash. 
My purpose in this concluding section is to suggest something 
similar with respect to Mr. Justice Harlan's use of history. The sug-
gestion is that the legislative history on which he relied in Reynolds 
v. Sims was serviceable, if at all, only in Carrington v. Rash, i.e., that 
l4l ~80 U.S. at 98, 
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the "original understanding" that he found conclusive had only to 
do with exclusive state power over suffrage qualifications and that 
it need not be extended in any event to the separate issue of mal-
apportionment. Especially is this so to the considerable extent that 
the original understanding was based on the allegedly preclusive 
effect of § 2. 
So far as an original understanding of the relevance of the Equal 
Protection Clause to issues of state legislative malapportionment is 
concerned, all one can safely conclude from the congressional his-
tory of the Fourteenth Amendment is that there was almost no men-
tion of the subject.142 The record in regard to malapportionment is 
even less readily construed against the application of the Amend-
ment in accordance with its unqualified language than with regard 
to countless other issues since swept within the broad normative 
standard of equal protection.143 
Even assuming that the clause was understood as not adding any 
national authority over voting qualifications, that understanding is 
not readily transferable by analogy to problems of malapportion-
ment for at least two reasons. First, it is at least arguable that the 
"right" of the states affected by requiring the roughly equal appor-
tionment of representatives within a state according to population is 
neither so basic nor the same kind as the "right" to prescribe voter 
142 But cf. the remarks of Blaine in opposition to H.R. No. 51 (although he 
subsequendy voted to approve it). GLoBE at 377, 538. Blaine felt that if the num-
ber of voters were made the basis of apportioning representatives among the 
states, each state would then apportion its representatives according to the dis-
tribution of voters within the state-effectively leaving areas populated by non-
voters without representation (and not merely without a vote in the choice of 
"their" representatives). To these and other objections, however, Bingham im-
mediately replied: "I apprehend that no possible amendment that can be sug-
gested to the Constitution of the United States on this subject will answer the 
purpose unless it is followed by further legislation." GLOBE at 377. Even Blaine's 
remarks were directed only to the apportionment of congressional, rather than 
state, representatives. The brief exchange between Blaine and Bingham occurred 
on January 23, 1866, three weeks before the original version of § 1 (H.R. No. 63) 
was reported in the House. 
143 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Schneider v. Rusk, 
377 U.S. 163 (1964); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
U.S. 12 (1956); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Nixon v. Herndon, 
273 U.S. 536 (1927); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). See also 
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qualifications. The latter question goes directly to the issue of who 
shall decide what persons are sufficiently qualified or fit to partici-
pate in affairs of state government at all. To say that certain varieties 
of malapportionment are within the Equal Protection Clause, on 
the other hand, is to say only that among the enfranchised elite, all 
of whom the state itself has found to be fully qualified to participate 
in affairs of government, no invidious distinctions shall be permit-
ted. The states may be as capricious as they please in withholding 
the ballot but not in perpetuating elites within the elite. The latter 
practice is a severe aggravation of the former one and surely need 
not be placed beyond correction on the strength of a doubtful con-
cession originally made concerning only the former, a concession 
not even carried into the language of the Constitution. 
The issue of malapportionment also differs from that of voter 
qualifications in terms of the particular constitutional clause which 
Mr. Justice Harlan relied upon as expressly reserving the latter sub-
ject to the states alone. His argument in significant part was that § 2 
expressly recognized the power of states to deny the right to vote 
and that it precluded the application of any other section by provid-
ing an exclusive remedy of its own, namely, a proportional reduc-
tion in a state's basis of congressional representation. Granting that 
this may arguably be so with respect to outright denials of the right 
to vote, is it equally so with respect to partial disfranchisement 
through malapportionment? Does § 2 propose the same exclusive 
(and preclusive) remedy here as well? 
Mr. Justice Harlan's history fails to suggest that it does. Again, no 
more than anyone else did he uncover any discussion of the rele-
vance of § 2 to malapportionment. He did, however, italicize that 
part of § 2 which declares that the basis of representation shall be 
reduced when the right to vote is denied "or in any way 
abridged,m44 and this may be thought to include instances of mal-
apportionment. With a little stretching, the language might suggest 
that the right to vote is "abridged" when the district in which a 
given voter resides is malapportioned so that his diluted vote is of 
less than average strength. Accordingly, Congress should regard all 
underrepresented state voters as having their votes denied or 
abridged and should exclude them from the population basis of the 
state for purposes of apportioning congressional representatives. 
144 377 U.S. at 593. 
33] THE "RIGHT" TO VOTE AND THE 39TH CONGRESS 81 
Correspondingly, the provision for this exclusive remedy in § 2 pre-
cludes consideration of malapportionment cases under the Equal 
Protection Clause of § 2. 
All this might be plausible, even granting that malapportionment 
was not discussed in the Thirty-ninth Congress. It becomes less 
plausible, however, once the congressional history of the critical 
phrase, "or in any way abridged," is canvassed and once it becomes 
clear that that phrase had nothing at all to do with malapportion-
ment. 
The word "abridged" was included in every draft of § 2, begin-
ning with H.R. No. 51 as reported by Stevens on January 22, 1866. 
H.R. No. 51, it will be recalled, provided for a reduction in the 
basis of representation only when the right to vote was "denied or 
abridged" because of race or color. The particular significance of 
"abridged" was not specifically discussed, but it may have been the 
result of a colloquy among Representatives Stevens, J enckes (Rhode 
Island), and Farnsworth (Illinois), on January 23. Jenckes raised 
the question whether a reduction in the basis of representation would 
be called for if a state substituted a property qualification for one 
based on race or color. Stevens replied that such a qualification, be-
ing impartial so far as race or color was concerned, would not be 
affected by his bill. Then Farnsworth cut in: 145 "Suppose the State 
of South Carolina should provide by law that no negro should hold 
real estate." To which Stevens replied: "Then the amendment 
operates." Thus, Stevens thought that the right to vote was being 
"denied or abridged" because of race or color when a state had one 
statute prescribing a particular qualification on some basis other than 
race or color and another statute making it impossible for Negroes 
to satisfy the "neutral" qualification. Obviously, however, the con-
versation is entirely in terms of how to determine who has been 
completely denied the right to vote, and not how weighty or valu-
able a fully qualified voter may have. 
When H.R. No. 127, the packaged amendment, was debated ~1 
the Senate in May, specific debate focused on "abridged," and ulti-
mately resulted in a substantial change in§ 2. On May 23, Senator 
Howard explained the new, consolidated Fourteenth Amendment as 
reported to both houses on April 30. Section 2 of the Amendment as 
proposed provided: 146 
14G GLOBE at 376. 146 I d. at 2764. (Emphasis added.) 
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Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States 
which may be included Within the Union, according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But whenever in 
any State, the elective franchise shall be denied to any portion 
of its male citizens not less than twenty-one years of age, 
or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion 
or other crime, the basis of representation in such State shall 
be reduced in the proportion which the number of male citi-
zens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens not less 
than twenty-one years of age. 
[1965 
Mter a brief discussion of this section, Howard was interrupted by 
Stewart of Nevada: 147 
MR. STEWART. I wish to call the attention of the Senator 
to the word "abridged" before he passes from that branch of 
the subject. I should like to understand the operation intended 
by that expression. 
MR. HowARD. The word "abridged" I regard as a mere in-
tensive, applicable to the preceding sentence. . . . I suppose 
it would admit of the following application: a State in the 
exercise of its sovereign power over the question of suffrage 
might permit one person to vote for a member of the State 
Legislature, but prohibit the same person from voting for 
a Representative in Congress. That would be an abridgment 
of the right of suffrage; and that person would be included in 
the exclusion, so that the representation from the State 
would be reduced in proportion to the exclusion of persons 
whose rights were thus abridged. 
Thus, it was Howard's view (from which no one dissented) that 
"the elective franchise" referred to in § 2 included the right to vote 
both for federal and state officers. The denial of the right to vote for 
any one of these officers would be regarded as an abridgment of the 
right to vote for them all, bringing the penalty provision into play. 
This explanation, while perfectly sensible, brought up a new 
problem. It was now clear that the phrase "elective franchise" 
meant to protect the right to vote for offices in addition to repre-
sentatives, but it remained unclear what other offices were included. 
Would it mean that the "elective franchise" would be "abridged," 
for instance, if a male citizen could vote for all significant federal 
and state offices, and yet not be permitted to vote for, say, county 
supervisor? Just what offices were included in the "elective fran-
chise?" 
147 ld. at 2767. 
33] THE "RIGHT" TO VOTE AND THE 39TH CONGRESS 83 
The issue was e:\.'}Jressly drawn in the Senate when, on June 7, 
Senator Williams of Oregon (a member of the Joint Committee) 
proposed a substitute for § 2 providing: 148 ". • • But whenever the 
right to vote at any election held under the Constitution and laws of 
the United States, or of any State, is denied to any of the male in-
habitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age and citizens 
of the United States, or in any way abridged •.•• " Williams' substi-
tute was immediately approved without discussion, by a voice vote. 
At once, however, Senator Henderson of Missouri called for a divi-
sion, urging the defeat of Williams' substitute because of the am-
biguity of the new language: 149 "Will it apply to the election of city 
officers under the amendment as it now stands?" 
MR. FESSENDEN. I think it would to municipal officers. 
MR. HENDERSON. Then why would it not apply to the elec-
tion of a township officer, because that is still larger? 
MR. CLARK. Is it a political office? I do not think a school di-
rector is. 
After more discussion of this type, Senator Grimes moved that the 
Senate adjourn in order to provide an opportunity for further clari-
fication of the types of office meant to be affected by § 2.150 The 
following day, the issue was taken up by Senator Johnson of Mary-
land:1o1 
In all the States there are elections of a municipal char-
acter that are regulated by law, and in which the franchise is 
different from that which prevails in the general elections of 
the State; and the consequence would be that where any per-
sons who are twenty-one years of age are denied the right 
to vote the basis of representation is to be lessened in the pro-
portion that the number excluded shall bear to the whole num-
ber falling within the class. . . . What I suggest, therefore, 
to the honorable member and to the Senate is, that the phrase-
ology of this amendment, if it is to prevail, shall be so changed 
as to leave it beyond doubt that all that is meant is to except 
out of the whole number of inhabitants of the age of twenty-
one years or upward, who are citizens of the State, those who 
are denied the right to vote at any State election, as contradis-
tinguished from any municipal election. Without such a 
qualification I am sure it will lead to very serious doubts, and 
it may lead, as those doubts may be resolved, to a very se-
rious diminution of the representation of several of the States. 
148/d. at 3010. 
149/bid. 
150 !d. at 3011. 
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Senator Williams immediately responded to Johnson's criticism: 1r;2 
I will state here that the amendment which I offered . . . 
is subject to some verbal criticism which is plausible, but I 
do not think well founded. I find it so easy to remove the 
difficulty that, upon consultation with the committee and 
other friends of the measure, I propose to strike out certain 
words and substitute others which will, perhaps, obviate some 
of the objections of the Senator. 
. . . I propose to modify it by striking out the words-
but whenever the right to vote at any election held under 
the Constitution and Laws of the United States or of any 
State-
And to insert the words: 
But when the right to vote at any election for the choice 
of electors for President and Vice President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judi-
cial officers of a State, or members of the Legislature 
thereof. 
Specifying particularly the officers for which these people 
must be allowed to vote in order to be counted. 
MR. JoHNSON. That removes some of the objections to 
which I supposed the original proposition was subject; and 
that shows how exceedingly cautious we should be in these 
constitutional amendments. . . . 
Later, still on June 8, Williams' amendment was approved by the 
Senate, 31 to 11, as a separate amendment unentangled with any 
others. Among those voting for it were Johnson, Stewart, Howard, 
and Williams.153 When the Senate version was returned to the 
House, Williams' version of § 2 was approved along with the rest of 
the Amendment, without particular discussion of his modification, 
by 120 to 32, on June 13.154 
Thus, the exclusive and express understanding of the phrase that 
superficially lends itself to an interpretation that it contemplated 
"abridgment" by dilution of one's vote through malapportionment 
in fact was completely different. It was, rather, that the right to vote 
protected by § 2 included the right to vote for all six specified 
groups of offices and that complete disqualification from voting for 
1G2 Ibid. 
153 I d. at 3040-41. The whole proposed amendment was then approved. I d. at 
3042. 
154 I d. at 3149. 
33] THE "RIGHT" TO VOTE AND THE 39TH CONGRESS 85 
any one of the six would constitute an "abridgment" of the right to 
vote for them all, for representational reduction purposes. 
There is, then, no evidence that § 2 was applicable to abridgments 
of the right to vote resulting from malapportionment of state legis-
latures. Whatever the arguable preclusive effect of § 2 respecting the 
power of states to determine voting qualifications unhampered by 
any restriction otherwise implied by the Equal Protection Clause, 
no such effect was understood regarding malapportionment. And 
§ 2 aside, there was no express understanding one way or the other, 
respecting the prospective relevance of the Equal Protection Clause 
to instances of state legislative malapportionment. 
It is true, of course, that some of the ratifying states may have 
been as malapportioned in 1866 as they were in 1963, although the 
futility of relying upon local political processes as a corrective was 
by no means so clear then as it has since become. It is even likely, by 
way of conjecture, that had the subject been discussed there might 
have been a disavowal of an intention to apply the Equal Protection 
Clause to malapportionment, at least at that time. The historical 
record in this respect, however, is no more controlling than it has 
been elsewhere: hypothetical answers to hypothetical questions 
never actually entertained at the time would be a most dubious basis 
for expounding the content of "equal protection" one hundred years 
later. 
The application of the Equal Protection Clause to practices of 
state legislative malapportionment is unexceptionable in terms of the 
inconclusive legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is 
neither precluded by any remedy exclusively provided in § 2 nor at 
variance with the language or any original and declared limitation 
on the Equal Protection Clause itself. Under these circumstances, it 
is difficult to believe that the decision in Reynolds v. Sims should 
have been foreclosed solely on the strength of the legislative history 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. At the very most, Mr. Justice 
Harlan's historical review in Reynolds v. Sims raises a fair question 
respecting the historical integrity of the Court's willingness to enter-
tain Carrigan v. Rash strictly as an equal protection case, since here 
state voter qualifications were themselves in issue. To that limited 
extent, it may be said that Mr. Justice Harlan wrote the "right" 
dissent in the "wrong" case. Even here, however, the dissent rests 
upon an extremely doubtful view of the original understanding. 
APPENDIX 
CHRONOLOGY oF FouRTEENTH AMENDMENT BILLs 
Date H.R. No. 51 H.R. No. 63 S. No. 61 Antecedent of § 2 Antecedent of § 1 Civil Rights Act 
Jan. 5 ...... Introduced in 
Senate 
Jan. 22 ..... Introduced in 
House 
Jan. 31. .... Passed House 
Feb. 2 ...... Passed Senate 
Feb. 13 ..... Introduced in 
House 
Mar. 9 ..... Inadequate vote of 
approval in Sen-
ate (25-22) 





Mar. 15 .... Senate concurs in 
amendment 
Mar. 27 .... Returned to 
Congress with 
veto 
Apr. 6 ..... Repassed in Sen-
ate 
Apr. 9 ..... Repassed in 
House 
H.R. No. 127: Consolidated Fourteenth Amendment 
Apr. 30 .... Introduced in House and Senate 
May 10 .... Passed in House 
June 8 ..... Passed with amendments in Senate 
June 13 .... House concurs in Senate amendment 
